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Abstract: Social anxiety disorder is a common syndrome characterized by excessive fear 
of negative evaluation in social situations. Cognitive theories (e.g., Clark & McManus, 
2002; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010) suggest that biases in attention play an 
important role in maintaining social fears. These models posit that socially anxious 
individuals focus attention on aspects of themselves (e.g., sensations of physiological 
arousal) and the social environment (e.g., potentially evaluative facial expressions) which 
indicate risk of negative appraisal by others. However, few studies have used lateralized 
event-related potentials (ERPs) to evaluate when these biases occur within stages of 
information processing. The goal of this study was to utilize ERPs (i.e., N2pc and CDA) 
during a change detection task in order to examine biases in selection (i.e., N2pc 
amplitude) and maintenance (i.e., CDA amplitude) of attention toward socially 
threatening faces in socially anxious subjects. Additionally, the effect of self-focused 
attention on these biases was examined using false heart rate feedback during the task. As 
hypothesized, socially anxious subjects showed early and sustained biased attention for 
disgust faces relative to neutral faces, and non-anxious controls did not show this bias. 
However, controls showed an early bias (N2pc) for disgust faces when heart rate cues 
were present, whereas socially anxious subjects showed no bias in this condition. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, controls showed an ipsilateral delay activity after being cued 
to attend to one hemifield, perhaps indicating active suppression of contralateral 
distractors. These findings and supplementary data are discussed in light of cognitive 
models of social anxiety disorder, recent empirical findings, and treatment.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is characterized by excessive fear of negative evaluation in 
social situations (APA, 2013). Cognitive models posit that social fears prompt biased attention 
toward fear-salient internal and external information (Clark & McManus, 2002; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). These theories share the 
prediction that social anxiety is maintained by cognitive biases which serve as core components 
in dysfunctional thought processes (see Amir & Foa, 2001; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). 
Attentional biases are particularly important to these models, which generally describe two types: 
1) internal self-focused attention and 2) external attention to cues that one may be evaluated 
negatively, including early (i.e., vigilance) and late processes (i.e., difficulty disengaging 
attention and attentional avoidance). Internal and external signals that may be sources of social 
threat are thought to be prioritized by selective attention and maintained in working memory. 
Furthermore, cognitive theories assert that these biases reduce the availability of attention for 
successfully navigating the social environment. This interference is thought to confirm the 
socially anxious person’s fear, thereby maintaining it and prompting maladaptive cognition in 
future social situations. 
Several theoretical discrepancies persist, and few data are available to address them. One 
distinction between these theories is that Clark (Clark & McManus, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995) 
emphasizes the role that self-focused attention plays in reduced attention to social cues. Clark 
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and McManus (2002) posit that biases in detecting social threat may only emerge if subjects are 
explicitly instructed to attend to social cues. Heimberg (Heimberg et al., 2010; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) suggests that vigilance for potentially negative social cues is fundamental and 
that, in combination with self-focused attention, reduces available resources for successful social 
interaction. Additionally, the literature is replete with mixed findings in reaction time data 
regarding vigilance, with many studies suggesting attentional avoidance of negative social 
information. This has presented a challenge to theories for the better part of two decades. 
Research has attempted to clarify moderators which may explain discrepant observations, but 
these studies are limited by a reliance on reaction time (e.g., Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 
2013) and/or eye tracking data (Schofield, Johnson, Inhoff, & Coles, 2012), neither of which 
measure attention directly. Thus, it is unclear to what extent discrepant findings may be the result 
of methodological limitations. 
In order to advance these theories, researchers have recently drawn hypotheses from 
models of anxiety and attention, particularly attentional control theory (e.g., Amir & Bomyea, 
2011; Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Wieser, Pauli, 
& Mühlberger, 2009). Attentional control theory (ACT) posits that anxiety is associated with 
increases in stimulus-driven attention, particularly toward threat, and reductions in goal-driven 
attention (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Anxiety is thought to motivate greater 
effort toward tasks, resulting in maintained performance at the cost of efficiency, provided that 
cognitive systems are not overburdened. ACT dovetails nicely with cognitive theories of SAD 
and draws more specific predictions regarding stages of information processing. Past research has 
suggested that testing the predictions of such theories within the context of SAD may advance 
both theories (e.g., Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013).  
Studies using event-related potentials, a non-invasive and direct measure of summated 
cortical post-synaptic potentials, may be particularly well-suited to resolving discrepancies in data 
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regarding SAD. The temporal resolution of ERPs exceeds that of reaction time studies, which 
include noise from non-attentional processes. ERPs also provide a direct measure of covert 
attention processes without relying upon downstream behavioral measures. Thus, ERPs are well-
suited to examine cognitive processes in social anxiety, and doing so has yielded interesting 
results. For example, Judah, Grant, Mills, and Lechner (2013) examined the CNV, a measure of 
cognitive resources deployed for response preparation, as subjects high and low in social anxiety 
prepared to look toward or away from stimuli. CNV amplitude was larger for socially anxious 
individuals compared to controls, but was significantly reduced for trials in which false heart rate 
feedback was presented. The authors interpreted this as evidence that the socially anxious group 
allocated more cognitive resources during response preparation, but when interoceptive threat 
was present, prompting self-focus, it distracted their attention from preparing a response.  
The N2pc and contralateral delay activity (CDA), both laterally distributed posterior-
occipital ERPs, are well-established as useful for examining selective attention and maintenance 
in working memory, respectively. Both ERPs are evident at scalp sites contralateral to the side of 
the visual field which is preferentially attended. The N2pc emerges about 200 ms after stimulus 
presentation, and the CDA emerges about 300 ms after a brief (e.g., 100 ms) stimulus 
presentation and persists as the stimulus is maintained in working memory (Luck & Hillyard, 
1994; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). The N2pc has been used to examine selective attention for 
objects appearing in one hemifield (i.e., side of the visual field) relative to those in the other (e.g., 
Weymar, Gerdes, Löw, Alpers, & Hamm, 2013), including facial expressions (Eimer & Kiss, 
2007). The CDA has been used to examine biases in working memory maintenance (i.e., 
difficulty disengaging attention), including biases for fearful facial expressions in anxious 
individuals. For example, Stout, Shackman, and Lawson (2013) examined an unselected sample 
using a change detection task in which subjects detected changes in faces with neutral and fearful 
facial expressions. They found that trait anxiety predicted greater working memory storage of 
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task-irrelevant fearful faces in working memory as indicated by the CDA. Thus, studies using the 
N2pc may be able to resolve questions regarding selective attention (i.e., vigilance) for social 
threat, and the CDA may be used to address questions about later attentional biases (i.e., 
avoidance and difficulty disengaging attention). Despite the advantages of the N2pc and CDA 
over other ERPs, including their unique suitability for evaluating the deployment of attention 
between objects concurrently within the visual field, a review of the literature suggested that 
researchers have not yet utilized either component to investigate attentional biases in social 
anxiety. 
 The present study drew its hypotheses from cognitive models of SAD, attentional control 
theory, and previous research. The primary goal was to examine whether socially anxious 
individuals display biased selection and storage in working memory for socially threatening 
faces. A secondary goal was to examine the influence of self-focused attention on these biases. 
This was examined using a modified change detection task. Subjects viewed an array of four 
faces, two on each side of the visual field. Faces on one side displayed neutral expressions, and 
those on the other displayed disgust expressions. The array then disappeared, followed by a cue to 
attend to one side. Subjects then reported whether or not any of the faces had changed in a 
subsequent test array. Self-focused attention was manipulated for 50% of trials by providing a 
randomly appearing change in the fixation symbol, which participants were told beforehand 
would indicate elevated heart rate. The N2pc, event-locked to the presentation of a stimulus array, 
was used to examine biases in selection of disgust versus neutral faces. Two CDA waveforms 
were evaluated following the offset of the stimulus array in order to investigate biases in working 
memory with and without the presence of task demands. The CDA immediately after the offset of 
the stimulus array (i.e., uncued CDA) was used to examine biases in working memory without 
task demands. The CDA following the cue to attend to one side was used to evaluate filtering of 
task-irrelevant information, including threatening faces, from working memory (i.e., cued CDA).  
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 It was hypothesized that socially anxious individuals would display biased selection of 
socially threatening facial expressions as indicated by larger N2pc amplitude for disgust faces 
compared to individuals low in social anxiety. Additionally, it was expected that the socially 
anxious group would show biased maintenance of threatening material (i.e., disgust faces) in 
working memory as reflected by larger amplitude of the uncued CDA compared to the control 
group. It was hypothesized that this effect would persist in the cued CDA, suggesting 
maintenance of threatening task-irrelevant material in working memory for socially anxious 
subjects. Specifically, cued CDA amplitude was expected to be larger for socially anxious 
subjects when prompted to attend to disgust faces and smaller when prompted to attend to neutral 
faces compared to controls. Lastly, it was hypothesized that the presence of false feedback that 
the subject’s heart rate had accelerated would enhance these effects. This is in line with theories 
which posit that self-focus increases the salience of external evaluative information and data 
which suggest that simultaneous cognitive processes may reduce the ability to effortfully direct 
attention away from threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). However, some theoretical perspectives (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995) 
alternatively predict that self-focus should result in reduced attention toward external stimuli, 
including socially threatening faces. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is among the most common of the anxiety disorders with a 
lifetime prevalence of 10-13% (APA, 2013; Kessler et al., 2005). SAD interferes with educational 
and occupational functioning and is associated with financial difficulties and lower 
socioeconomic status (Brown, Heimberg, & Juster, 1995; Heimberg et al., 1990; Katzelnick et al., 
2001; Lipsitz & Schneier, 2000). Furthermore, individuals with SAD are at increased risk for 
major depressive disorder (Grant, Beck, Farrow, & Davila, 2007; Grant et al., 2014), alcohol and 
substance abuse (Buckner et al., 2008; Morris, Stewart, & Ham, 2005), suicidal ideation 
(Davidson, Wingate, Grant, Judah, & Mills, 2011) and, in cases of comorbid depression, suicide 
attempts (Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). The disorder tends to take a 
chronic course typically lasting a median of 25 years (DeWit, Ogborne, Offord, & MacDonald, 
1999).  
Theories of Social Anxiety Disorder 
 Various theoretical perspectives have contributed to the conceptualization of SAD. 
Interpersonal theories of SAD (e.g., Alden, 2001; Alden & Taylor, 2004; 2010) posit that 
individuals with SAD engage in social behaviors aimed toward two conflicting goals: 1) to 
achieve closeness with others and 2) to avoid negative evaluation. Social fears are learned via 
these strategic interpersonal behaviors (e.g., minimal self-disclosure). However, these behaviors
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are actually socially maladaptive and elicit reactions from others which confirm social fears, a 
process which results in distorted relational schemas (Alden & Phillips, 1990; Alden & Taylor, 
2010). These schemas are the basis for future expectations about social situations and  
prompt greater fear. Thus, the process is a maladaptive feedback loop. Research generally 
supports this theoretical perspective (e.g., Davila & Beck, 2002; Grant, Beck, Farrow, & Davila, 
2007, Grant et al., 2014; Tucker et al., 2013). For example, Tucker and colleagues (2013) found 
that the use of self-defeating humor, characterized by public self-deprecation, moderated the 
relationship between social anxiety and depression such that it was stronger for individuals who 
used this type of humor. Davila and Beck (2002) found that social anxiety predicted a variety of 
dysfunctional interpersonal styles, including poor assertiveness and overreliance upon others, 
both of which mediated the relationship between social anxiety and interpersonal stress. In a 
prospective study using structural equation modeling, Grant, Beck, Farrow, & Davila (2007) 
found that social anxiety was associated with low assertiveness, interpersonal dependency, and 
avoidance of emotional expression, the last of which also predicted depressive symptoms one 
year later. Such research has increased our understanding of how SAD develops as well as factors 
which affect its course and risk for other negative outcomes. 
 With the advent of neuroimaging and gene-sequencing techniques, neurobiological 
theories have begun to contribute to knowledge about SAD and to confirm the predictions of 
cognitive theories (see Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010 for a review). These models typically build 
upon existing frameworks describing how localized neurochemistry and connectivity among 
brain regions are involved in emotion and cognition. The corticolimbic (also known as the limbic-
cortical) model is pre-eminent among these theories. As alluded to by its name, this theory 
focuses on the role of aberrant functioning of corticolimbic areas and the connections between 
them. The amygdala is one important limbic structure which plays a basic role in emotional 
processing and has been particularly implicated in fear and anxiety. For example, studies 
examining animal models undergoing fear conditioning have shown increased amygdala 
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reactivity to the conditioned stimulus (see Pine, 2001 for a review). Amygdala lesions in 
macaques have resulted in disinhibition of social behaviors and approach toward novel objects 
(Amaral, 2002). Humans have shown enhanced amygdala reactivity when viewing negative 
emotional images (Shah, Klumpp, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2009). For individuals with SAD, 
enhanced amygdala activity has been observed when exposed to social threat cues (Furmark et 
al., 2002, 2004; Tillfors et al., 2001; Tillfors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 2002) and 
threatening facial expressions (i.e., angry, contemptuous, disgusted, and fearful faces; Phan et al., 
2006; Stein, Goldin, Sareen, Zorrilla, & Brown, 2002). Furthermore, research suggests that there 
is an association between this reactivity and symptom severity (Phan, Fitzgerald, Nathan, & 
Tancer, 2006). Even eye contact can result in amygdala reactivity for individuals with SAD 
(Schneier, Kent, Star, & Hirsch, 2009). Following successful treatment of SAD, individuals show 
reduced amygdala response to social threat (Furmark et al., 2002; 2005; 2008). 
The hippocampus is a critical part of the corticolimbic model. Its coordination with the 
amygdala has presented a challenge to investigations of the hippocampus’ role in social anxiety 
disorder. Extant data suggest that the hippocampus is involved in evaluating potentially 
threatening information, a function which fits neatly with cognitive models (see Freitas-Ferrari, et 
al., 2010). Studies observing dysfunction in this region have linked it with generalization of 
threatening stimuli and related anxiety (Cannistraro & Rauch, 2003; Freitas-Ferrari, et al., 2010). 
In support of the corticolimbic model, research suggests that cortical areas receiving hippocampal 
projections (e.g., the parahippocampal gyrii) are activated when social phobics view social-
evaluative faces (Goldin, Manber, Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009).  
Several other cortical areas have been implicated in SAD, including the insula, medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a region which overlaps with 
mPFC. The insula is involved in interoceptive and pain awareness (Freitas-Ferrari, et al., 2010). 
Studies have noted insula hyperactivation when socially anxious individuals view faces with 
direct eye contact (Schneier, et al., 2009). This is consistent with the prediction of cognitive 
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models that socially anxious individuals have increased self-focus in threatening social situations, 
including forming third-person images of the self as others may see it (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The mPFC has been observed to be involved in anticipatory 
processing (Tillfors et al., 2002). GABAergic neurons in the medial prefrontal cortical area in 
general are thought to downregulate the amygdala (Freitas-Ferrari, et al., 2010), indicating an 
important relationship typical of the interactive functioning that the corticolimbic model 
proposes. Abnormalities in the insula and mPFC have been observed to attenuate with successful 
treatment (Warwick, et al., 2010).  
The ACC, a structure which mediates prefrontal cortex and structures in the limbic 
system, appears to be an integral part of the corticolimbic theory. In individuals with SAD the 
ACC reacts to faces displaying disgust, and this activity is associated with faster recognition of 
disgust and more negative evaluations of neutral faces (Amir, et al., 2005). Like the insula, the 
ACC reacts to direct eye gaze (Schneier, et al., 2009), perhaps as it attempts to categorize this 
innocuous cue as threatening or neutral and recruit cortical resources for an appropriate response. 
For this reason, it has been suggested that the hyperactivity of certain regions of the ACC in 
social anxiety is related to disinhibition of response to negative emotional stimuli (Amir, et al., 
2005). Yet, as with any neural structure, sub-regions may function differently. The dorsal region 
of the ACC, for example, has been shown to recruit the dorsolateral PFC to regulate the limbic 
system and control attention (Freitas-Ferrari, et al., 2010; Kerns et al., 2004). In contrast the 
subgenual ACC, which has extensive limbic connectivity, including extensive connections to the 
amygdala, is active during the processing of harsh facial expressions, particularly when socially 
anxious individuals are not engaging in emotion regulation (Goldin, et al., 2009). More distal 
cortical regions involved in visual attention also have been identified as important neural 
correlates of SAD. These include the fusiform face area and the inferior occipital gyrus, which 
are hyperactive when socially anxious individuals view threatening faces (Goldin, et al., 2009).  
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 In addition to the neuroanatomical correlates of SAD, neurochemicals, particularly 
serotonin, and their regulators have been implicated in the disorder. Serotonin transporters, 
presynaptic proteins responsible for reuptake of serotonin from the synaptic cleft, are one key 
regulator of serotonin in the brain (Lesch et al., 1996). Expression of the serotonin transporter 
gene (SLC6A4) is modulated by gene variants, including those in the SLC6A4-linked 
polymorphism in the promoter region of the gene (5-HTTLPR; see Canli & Lesch, 2007). This 
polymorphism is of particular interest because of research which implicates its role in SAD 
(Furmark et al., 2004; 2009), attentional biases (Beevers, Ellis, Wells, & McGeary, 2010; 
Beevers, Gibb, McGeary, & Miller, 2007; Beevers, Wells, Ellis, & McGeary, 2009; Fox, 
Ridgewell, & Ashwin, 2009), activity in brain areas implicated in SAD (Canli et al., 2005; 
Furmark et al., 2004; 2009; Graff-Guerrero et al., 2005; Hariri et al., 2005), and treatment 
response in SAD (Stein, Seedat, & Gelernter, 2006). It is important to note that research 
implicates the polymorphism in a variety of anxiety and mood disorders, particularly major 
depressive disorder, rather than SAD in particular (see Canli & Lesch, 2007). Generally, the 
literature suggests that short alleles of the polymorphism are associated with dysfunction, 
although there are exceptions which implicate long alleles (e.g., Arbelle et al., 2003). Short alleles 
of the serotonin transporter gene have been found to be associated with blushing in subjects with 
SAD (Domschke, et al., 2009). Moreover, diminished grey matter in the ACC and amygdala has 
been identified in homozygous carriers of the short allele (Pezawas, et al., 2005). In a series of 
studies, Furmark and colleagues (2004) found that short alleles predicted greater symptom 
severity and amygdala reactivity in social phobics and that possessing one, or especially two, 
short alleles predicted amygdala reactivity to angry faces for both socially anxious and healthy 
control subjects (Furmark et al., 2009). Homozygous carriers of the long allele have been found 
to show greater selective attention for positive stimuli and avoidance of negative stimuli (Fox et 
al., 2009), and this finding has been replicated using emotional faces (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2010). 
Similarly, other studies have suggested that short allele carriers display difficulty disengaging 
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attention from emotional stimuli, including happy, sad, and fearful images (Beevers et al., 2009). 
In a follow-up study using eye tracking, these researchers found that homozygous carriers of the 
short allele displayed longer fixation of eye gaze for positive images compared to carriers of at 
least one long allele (Beevers et al., 2010). Together, these studies suggest a possible 
neurocognitive endophenotype which conveys vulnerability to anxiety and mood pathology, 
although more research is needed, particularly studies which investigate gene-environment 
interactions.  
Cognitive Models 
  Cognitive theories of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark & McManus, 2002; Heimberg et 
al., 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have been particularly influential in research spanning the 
last two decades. These models are characterized by a focus on the role of information-processing 
(i.e., attention, interpretation, and memory) and elaborative thought processes in the development 
and maintenance of symptoms. As with other cognitive theories of psychopathology, these 
theories posit that maladaptive beliefs about the self and others are fundamental to the disorder. 
For example, socially anxious individuals may believe that they are unlikeable, awkward, 
unintelligent, or in other ways lack qualities which they believe are necessary to be accepted by 
others. The ambiguity of social situations presents opportunities for negatively biased cognitive 
processes. The resulting experience of such situations as threatening reaffirms dysfunctional 
beliefs and perpetuates social fears, a process which becomes a vicious cycle (Clark & McManus, 
2002; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 According to cognitive models, a variety of maladaptive processes are fundamental to 
SAD. Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that these dysfunctional cognitions occur before, during, 
and after social interactions. Before these situations, individuals engage in anticipatory 
processing, a repetitive negative thinking style in which one imagines herself/himself in an 
upcoming social situation. In the midst of social situations, individuals imagine themselves as a 
social object from a third-person perspective. They experience increases in self-focused attention 
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and vigilance for cues which might indicate negative evaluation. Aspects of the situation are 
interpreted in a negatively biased way. After the social situation, socially anxious individuals 
engage in post-event processing, a ruminative focus on aspects of the social situation which were 
perceived to be negative (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 One important aspect of cognitive models is that they propose mechanisms whereby 
cognitive processes maintain anxiety. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggested that the automatic 
allocation of attention toward self and threat in the environment reduces the availability of 
cognitive resources which might otherwise be employed toward successful social behaviors. They 
labeled this the “multiple task paradigm” and suggested that one level of interference occurs 
simply because there are additional and unnecessary cognitive processes at work in social 
situations. For example, attention toward one’s physiological anxiety symptoms may distract 
them from detecting subtle social cues, resulting in socially inappropriate behavior. Additionally, 
cognitive biases may prevent the detection or accurate processing of positive social feedback. 
Biased attention and interpretation regarding aspects of the self and environment serves as 
evidence supporting the validity of social fears. This prompts socially anxious individuals to 
engage in safety behaviors, which are attempts to avoid or mitigate particularly threatening 
elements of the situation. For example, a socially anxious individual may frequently check a 
cellular phone or pretend to read and send texts in order to dampen the negative evaluation or 
awkwardness they fear will occur during conversations. Ironically, these behaviors may increase 
the likelihood that others will react in ways that are feared. Thus, cognitive models predict that 
dysfunctional cognitive processes are a key source of maladaptive social behaviors and that these 
thoughts and behaviors maintain social fears and may even contribute to feared outcomes. 
 Cognitive models of SAD describe processes which bear a close resemblance to 
constructs in the social psychology literature, such as anchoring and adjusting, the spotlight 
effect, and the illusion of transparency. Anchoring and adjusting refers to a heuristic used in 
ambiguous situations. The most conveniently available information is used as a starting point 
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(anchoring) and is rectified afterward if other information is available (adjusting; see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). This heuristic may play a role in the spotlight effect, a cognitive bias in which 
one overestimates how much they are the object of others’ attention (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). 
Research suggests that this process is driven by anchoring to one’s internal experience and failing 
to adjust, that is, to take into account that others’ experiences may be different from one’s own 
(Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). The spotlight effect resembles self-focused attention as described by 
cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
A concept closely related to the spotlight effect, the illusion of transparency, occurs when 
a person overestimates the extent to which his/her internal state is noticeable to others. Research 
suggests that this process is driven by emotional and physiological sensations of such an intensity 
that the person becomes keenly aware of them and believes they must also be noticeable to others 
(Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; 
Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). In the case of social anxiety, where such symptoms might lead to 
negative evaluation, it is not surprising that social fears and self-focus may exacerbate one 
another. Indeed, Savitsky and Gilovich (2003) observed the illusion of transparency in an 
unselected sample during a public speaking task and concluded that speech anxiety and the 
illusion of transparency were mutually increasing one another. A closely related phenomenon, the 
observer’s illusion of transparency, describes an overestimation of one’s ability to know what 
others are thinking and feeling. This resembles predictions in interpersonal and cognitive models 
of SAD which posit that socially anxious individuals assume that others are fundamentally 
judgmental, a belief which may be driven by anchoring to their own self-evaluation. 
Support for Cognitive Models 
Self-focused Attention (Internal Bias). 
Evidence generally supports the predictions of cognitive models with regard to self-focus 
in SAD. Early investigations pre-dating the leading cognitive models relied on self-report 
measures assessing self-consciousness and found evidence of a relationship with social anxiety 
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(Bruch & Heimberg, 1994; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Hope, Heimberg, & Klein, 1990; 
Melchior & Cheek, 1990). Research has suggested that this self-focus was specific to public 
rather than private self-consciousness, which are distinguished by their observability to others 
(Hope & Heimberg, 1988). Following the advent of cognitive theories of SAD, researchers began 
to examine the specific predictions of these models. For example, Hackmann, Surawy, and Clark 
(1998) conducted semi-structured interviews with social phobics and healthy controls. They 
found that the SAD group reported a higher rate (77%) than controls (10%) of intrusive imagery 
of how they appeared to others from a third-person point of view.  
Researchers also have investigated the role of interoceptive preoccupation in self-focused 
attention. The association between physiological arousal and increased self-focus/self-awareness 
has long been observed (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978; Scheier & Carver, 1983; Wegner, & 
Giuliano, 1980). Additionally, studies of anxiety sensitivity, the fear of physiological symptoms 
of anxiety and their potential negative consequences, suggest it is a common feature across the 
anxiety disorders (Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010; Grant, Beck, & Davila, 
2007; Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992). Along these lines, a recent study 
found that subjects with SAD reported greater anxiety and greater subjective intensity of somatic 
sensations during interoceptive exercises than did healthy controls (Collimore & Asmundson, 
2013). Other research has found that individuals with SAD have greater anxiety about potential 
social consequences to their physiological symptoms, particularly negative evaluation (Carleton, 
Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006; Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & 
Leybman, 2007; Rodriguez, Bruce, Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007). This 
research supports the hypothesis that attention toward physiological symptoms, particularly those 
associated with anxiety, may play a key role in self-focused attention. 
Several studies have found evidence that individuals with SAD monitor their physiology, 
particularly their heart rate, which prompts the formation of negative self-images (Mansell, Clark, 
& Ehlers, 2003; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2002; Stevens et al., 2011; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 
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1998; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999). Research also suggests that attention to 
somatic/physiological sensations is associated with more negatively biased beliefs about how one 
is being evaluated (Mansell & Clark, 1999; McEwan & Devins, 1983; Mellings & Alden, 2000; 
Woody, 1996). Gerlach, Mourlane, and Rist (2006) compared the anxiety levels of subjects with 
SAD and healthy controls while they listened to their own heart beat privately or before a group 
who also heard it. Subjects with SAD reported more anxiety than controls and increased anxiety 
and worry when heart beats were heard by others compared to the private condition, whereas the 
control group did not. Similarly, another study found that socially anxious children perceived 
false audible heart rate feedback to be faster compared to controls and that they were more 
worried when this feedback was public, but the control group was not (Schmitz, Blechert, 
Krämer, Asbrand, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2012). Such studies have advanced cognitive theories by 
specifying basic aspects of self-focused attention, specifically, that social phobics are anxious 
about how others may perceive somatic evidence of their anxiety. Some of this research went 
further by attempting to manipulate self-focused attention using pseudo heart rate feedback (e.g., 
Mansell et al., 2003; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2002), finding that this was associated with a 
disproportionately greater increase in self-focus and anxiety for socially anxious subjects 
compared to controls. Following this research, Judah, Grant, Mills, and Lechner (2013) examined 
the effect of false heart rate feedback on anxiety and attentional control in an antisaccade task. 
They found that, compared to non-anxious controls, socially anxious subjects reported greater 
increases in self-consciousness when cued that their heart rate was elevated. Additionally, they 
reported that the feedback caused greater interference with their task performance than did 
controls. Interestingly, Judah and colleagues also found that socially anxious subjects showed 
delayed onset of the P3b waveform, an ERP reflecting stimulus categorization, when heart rate 
feedback was present. This was interpreted as evidence that self-focused attention was interfering 
with cognitive efficiency. Moreover, socially anxious individuals showed greater CNV amplitude 
prior to saccades than controls, suggesting greater effort. However, this was reduced for the 
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socially anxious group for trials on which heart rate feedback was provided, suggesting that self-
focused attention was interfering with the deployment of attention in preparation for making task-
relevant responses. These results suggested that self-focused attention, particularly cues of 
physiological arousal (e.g., accelerated heart rate), interfere with cognitive processes in socially 
anxious individuals. 
Other recent studies have examined the relationship between self-focused attention and 
anticipatory processing. Mills, Grant, Judah, and Lechner (2014) assigned undergraduates who 
were low or high in social anxiety to engage in approximately five minutes of anticipatory 
processing or distraction after being told that they would engage in a subsequent social 
interaction. They found that HSAs in the anticipation condition reported more self-focus than 
those in the distraction condition. This self-focus also mediated the relationship between social 
anxiety group and interpretation biases. In a follow-up study, Mills, Grant, Judah, and White 
(2014) examined the effect of this anticipatory processing manipulation on internal and external 
attentional biases in socially anxious and non-anxious participants. Self-focused attention was 
assessed using a dot-probe task in which pictures of heart rate waveforms and sound waves were 
presented on opposite sides of the screen. Participants were misled to believe that the heart rate 
waveforms were snapshots of their own heart rate. Mills and colleagues found that socially 
anxious subjects in the anticipation condition showed a large increase in self-focused attention as 
measured by bias change scores. Both of these studies provide support for the prediction that 
anticipatory processing increases self-focus, and these findings support and advance cognitive 
theories of SAD. 
External Biases. 
 Empirical findings regarding biases in external attention are less clear than those for self-
focused attention. Broadly, studies support preferential detection of socially threatening material 
in social anxiety, a process often labeled “vigilance” (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). However, much 
of the literature has been unable to clarify the time course of attentional biases, particularly how 
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attention is deployed at later stages. This literature is strengthened by use of a variety of 
paradigms, including emotional Stroop, dot-probe, and visual search tasks, as well as various 
outcome measures, including reaction time, performance, and eye tracking. 
The emotional Stroop task (see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a review) was 
one of the earliest tasks that assessed attentional biases by measuring interference with processing 
task-relevant features of stimuli. The task was adapted from Stroop’s (1935) original design, 
which requires participants to name the color of various color-words (e.g., “red”) which are 
congruent or incongruent with the color of the word. Incongruent trials typically result in slower 
reaction times than congruent trials, suggesting that processing of task-irrelevant stimulus 
features interferes with the task. Researchers have noted similar results when using threat words. 
Slowed reaction times are evident in individuals with SAD (Amir et al., 1996; Amir, Freshman, 
& Foa, 2002; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Lundh & Öst, 1996; Maidenberg, 
Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky,1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; McNeil et al., 1995) 
and socially anxious individuals (Grant & Beck, 2006) when identifying the color of social threat 
words. Lundh and Öst (1996) found that subjects with SAD did not differ from healthy controls 
in Stroop effects for color or general threat. Thus, research using the emotional Stroop task 
generally has supported predictions of cognitive models of SAD.  
The dot-probe task (also known as the visual probe or probe detection task) is among the 
most commonly used paradigms for investigating attentional biases in SAD. First introduced by 
MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986), this task evaluates the costs of biased attention on probe 
detection. Typically, a pair of pictures appears simultaneously on each side of (alternatively, 
above and below) a centrally located fixation cross. The stimuli disappear, and a probe is 
presented immediately in the location of one of the stimuli. Participants must identify the position 
of the probe. If an attentional bias toward one of the stimuli is present, this is likely to lead to the 
preferential deployment of attention toward one stimulus so that detection of the probes that 
replace that type of stimulus will be speeded relative to probes which replace the other stimulus 
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type. Various versions of the task have been developed which compare more than two stimuli, 
require probe identification (e.g., “E” or “F”), or present stimuli at varying stimulus onset 
asynchronies (SOAs). In the social anxiety literature, the dot-probe task commonly utilizes pairs 
of socially threatening and neutral words or facial expressions. Bias scores are calculated by 
subtracting mean reaction times to probes replacing emotional stimuli from mean reaction times 
to probes replacing neutral stimuli (e.g., Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills., 2013).  Overall, dot-
probe studies examining clinical samples using short SOAs (i.e., < 500 ms) have supported Rapee 
and Heimberg’s (1997) prediction that socially anxious individuals show preferential detection of 
environmental cues which indicate potential social threat (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Mueller et al., 2009; Musa, Lépine, Clark, Mansell, & Ehlers, 2003; 
Sposari & Rapee, 2007). Results have been similar in studies comparing groups high and low in 
social anxiety without assessing diagnostic status (e.g., Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 
2002; Vassilopoulos, 2005). However, there are notable exceptions which fail to support 
attentional bias toward threat (e.g., Horenstein & Segui, 1997; Pineles & Mineka, 2005).  
Visual search tasks represent another paradigm which assesses attentional biases via 
reaction time costs. This task requires participants to locate a target within a field of distractors. 
Few studies have used this approach to examine social anxiety, yet those that have done so 
support cognitive models. For example, a study using the face-in-the crowd paradigm (i.e., visual 
search task using faces) found that subjects with SAD, but not healthy controls, showed 
attentional biases for angry compared to happy faces (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999). 
This finding was replicated in a similar study using schematic facial expressions (Juth, Lundqvist, 
Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005). 
Eye tracking has several advantages over reaction time tasks. Unlike the dot-probe task, 
which provides only a snapshot of attentional deployment, eye tracking can assess the 
deployment of attention using numerous parameters, such as duration of fixation and onset of 
saccadic movements. Eye positions also represent a more direct measure of overt attention than 
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reaction time (Duchowski, 2007, pp. 209). Nevertheless, there are limitations to the inferences 
that can be drawn about attention using eye tracking. Helmholz (1962) first demonstrated that 
attention could be directed effortfully toward stimuli in the parafoveal and peripheral parts of the 
visual field. For the socially anxious person, eye-gaze may constitute a social behavior that could 
elicit evaluation from others. Thus, these individuals may be motivated to mask the focus of their 
attention by not looking at it directly or doing so only briefly.  
Importantly, eye tracking has been combined with other paradigms, such as dot-probe 
tasks, in order to overcome the limitations of each approach. For example, Schofield and 
colleagues (2012) used eye tracking in a dot-probe task and found evidence suggesting that 
socially anxious individuals display biased attention, as indicated by longer dwell times, toward 
emotional faces throughout a 1500 ms stimulus presentation. In contrast to this, a similar study 
found attentional bias toward emotional faces during the first second of presentation, but 
avoidance of emotional faces from 1000 to 1500 ms (Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & 
Mühlberger, 2009). This discrepancy is characteristic of mixed findings regarding late attentional 
biases, as is described more fully below. Such discrepancies may be due to limitations associated 
with particular paradigms. Because the dot-probe task presents an unrealistic scenario which 
encourages attention to be deployed toward one of two stimuli, Horley and colleagues (2003; 
2004) conducted two studies using eye tracking while presenting single images depicting 
emotional facial expressions to subjects with SAD and healthy controls. In both studies the 
clinical group displayed less dwell time on facial features, particularly the eyes and mouth, 
compared to controls. Such studies exemplify the important contributions that eye tracking has 
made to understanding attentional biases in SAD.  
Several studies have utilized event-related potentials to investigate attentional biases in 
social anxiety (Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Kolassa et al., 2009; Kolassa, Kolassa, 
Musial, & Miltner, 2007; Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; 
Mueller et al., 2009; Peschard, Philippot, Joassin, & Rossignol, 2013; Rossignol, Anselme, 
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Vermeulen, Philippot, & Campanella, 2007). For example, Moser and colleagues (2008) 
examined ERPs as subjects high and low in social anxiety completed a modified version of the 
Erikson flanker task using positive and threatening facial expressions. This task includes a target 
with a series of peripheral stimuli which are congruent or incongruent with the central target, 
which the subject must identify. The late positive potential (LPP) waveform, a measure of 
emotional processing of stimuli, was larger for socially anxious subjects, but not controls, when 
viewing threatening face targets compared to positive targets, suggesting greater attention toward 
threat. Mueller and colleagues (2009) examined ERPs in socially anxious and control subjects 
who completed a dot-probe task using emotional facial expressions. Socially anxious subjects 
displayed smaller P1 amplitude, reflecting reduced spatial attention for that area (see Luck et al., 
1994), for face pairs which contained a happy face compared to those which contained a negative 
(angry) facial expression. The authors interpreted this as evidence supporting vigilance for threat. 
P1 amplitudes for probes replacing neutral faces were larger compared to probes replacing 
emotional faces, a finding which suggests deployment of attention toward these locations in 
preference to those which contained threatening information. Another study examined subjects 
high and low in social anxiety as they viewed emotional facial expressions in an oddball 
paradigm and found that socially anxious subjects displayed a reduced N2b when detecting 
changes in the intensity of angry faces (Rossignol et al., 2007). Additionally, they found that 
socially anxious subjects showed delayed ERPs related to the categorization of angry faces which 
followed disgust faces, a pattern not present when this order was reversed or in control subjects 
under either condition. The authors interpreted this as evidence of the involuntary persistence of 
disgust faces in working memory. Although ERPs represent an important tool for testing 
cognitive models, the extant literature has several limitations, including studies which report 
substandard methodology (e.g., poor control of event timing, high impedances, over-filtering) 
and/or utilize components and paradigms which achieve ambiguous results. 
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 Although extensive evidence supports attentional bias toward threat in studies using 
socially threatening words (Amir & Bomyea, 2011; Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Grant & Beck, 
2006; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Maidenberg et al., 1996; Mattia et al., 1993; 
McNeil, et al., 1995; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) and faces (Garner, 
Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013; Juth et al., 2005, study 4; Kolassa 
et al., 2007; Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2004; Mühlberger, 
Wieser, Herrmann, Weyers, Tröger, & Pauli, 2009; Pishyar et al., 2004; Schofield et al., 2012; 
Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009), many studies have achieved discrepant 
results with regard to late attentional biases. Several studies suggest that social anxiety is 
associated with attentional avoidance at later stages (the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis; Mogg et 
al., 2004; Mueller et al., 2009; Pishyar et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, 
Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009), and several other studies report an opposite pattern of findings, that 
socially anxious individuals show difficulty disengaging attention from social threat (Amir, Elias, 
Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Buckner, Maner, & Schmidt, 2010; Moriya & Tanno, 2010; 2011; 
Schofield et al., 2012).  
One of the more promising hypotheses for resolving the avoidance/difficulty disengaging 
controversy has been the examination of attentional control as a moderator. Cisler and Koster 
(2010) suggested that attentional avoidance may be effortful and therefore dependent on the 
availability of cognitive resources (i.e., working memory). In order to test this hypothesis, Judah, 
Grant, Lechner, and Mills (2013) modified a dot-probe task with emotional faces, a classic 
paradigm in this literature, to include a concurrent n-back task. The n-back task presented random 
cues prompting subjects to verbally identify the probe which appeared one (i.e., 1-back) or two 
(i.e., 2-back) trials previously. Stimuli were presented for 1500 ms in order to assess late 
attentional biases. Participants completed a standard dot-probe task as well as blocks with low 
(i.e., 1-back) and high (i.e,. 2-back) working memory load. The results suggested that socially 
anxious subjects showed avoidance of disgust faces when working memory load was absent or 
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low (i.e., 1-back). However, subjects showed attentional biases toward (i.e., difficulty 
disengaging attention) these faces when working memory load was high (i.e., 2-back). The 
authors interpreted these findings as supportive of Cisler and Koster’s hypothesis that the 
availability of working memory resources plays an important role in determining whether socially 
anxious subjects show avoidance or difficulty disengaging attention from threat. Findings from 
similar studies also lend support to this hypothesis (e.g., Derrybery & Reed, 2002; Ladouceur et 
al., 2009). For example, Derryberry and Reed (2002) found that attentional control moderated 
attentional biases in a sample high in trait anxiety. Subjects high in attentional control showed 
avoidance of threatening stimuli, whereas subjects low in attentional control displayed difficulty 
disengaging attention. Similarly, Ladouceur and colleagues (2009) found that high trait anxiety 
was associated with slowed reaction times for threatening stimuli during the high load (i.e., 2-
back) condition of an emotional n-back task. 
 Although this study (i.e., Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013) may contribute toward 
understanding the time course of attentional biases in social anxiety, its results have several 
limitations. First, the dot-probe task provides only a snapshot of attention. Second, being a 
reaction time task, it is an indirect measure of attentional processes. Third, it is unclear why 
working memory load would vary among extant studies to produce the mixed results. Thus, the 
role of working memory load as a moderator of late attentional biases may lack explanatory 
power for discrepant findings regarding late attentional biases. Therefore, more research is 
needed which 1) assesses attentional biases with greater temporal precision, 2) uses direct 
measures of attentional deployment (e.g., ERPs), and 3) examines processes in social anxiety 
which may result in working memory load and thereby moderate attentional biases. With regard 
to this last point, self-focused attention in socially anxious individuals appears to preoccupy 
working memory resources and interfere with executive function. As noted earlier, Judah, Grant, 
Mills, and Lechner (2013) found that false heart rate feedback affected socially anxious subjects 
by reducing task-related attention, as indicated by an attenuated CNV, and by delaying 
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categorization of instructional cues, as reflected in later P3b latency. This evidence supports 
cognitive theories, which posit that self-focused attention interferes with attention toward 
information in the environment, by suggesting that self-focus can impair attentional control. 
These data also suggest that examining working memory may be important for research 
investigating attentional biases.  
Theories of Working Memory 
The concept of working memory can be traced back to William James (1890) who 
described what he called “primary memory” as “the trailing edge of consciousness.” Theories of 
working memory necessarily posit that memory consists of multiple components. As described by 
Baddeley (2007), working memory theories have been challenged by single component models 
for much of the last century. Such models aimed to parsimoniously explain memory using 
learning theory (see McGeoch & Irion, 1952). Their influence was upheld by studies which 
suggested that decays in memory at short intervals were paralleled by decays in longer-term 
storage (e.g., Melton, 1962). Nevertheless, multi-component models occasionally surfaced, as in 
the case of Hebb’s (1949) hypothesis that transient neural activity was responsible for short-term 
memory and that enduring changes in the brain explained long term memory.  
 During the 1960s, cognitive psychology gave rise to information-processing models of 
memory (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Broadbent, 1958). Baddeley (2007) describes how this 
resulted in several revolutionary changes to the science of memory. First, memory processes were 
conceptualized as distinct stages, including storage, encoding, and retrieval. This enabled 
theorists to describe aspects of memory with greater precision and thereby produce more reliable 
models. Second, the two system framework was salvaged, partly due to its explanatory power for 
observations concerning memory systems. Third, novel experimental approaches in cognitive 
psychology improved the testability of models. This gave theoreticians both the motivation and 
the means to create more detailed models of memory (Tulving, 1979). During this time, Waugh 
and Norman (1965) revived Hebb’s (1949) distinction between short-term and long-term 
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memory. Neuropsychological research, such as studies of patients with long-term but not short-
term memory losses, and vice versa, provided support for this (e.g., Milner, 1966; Shallice & 
Warrington, 1970). Observations confirming that deficits could be isolated to one system with 
little or no effect in other memory systems served as a compelling argument for their theoretical 
distinction (Baddeley, 2007). 
Thus, acceptance of the two-component model of memory increased. One popular theory 
was that of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), which was known as the modal model, alternatively, the 
information-processing model. The advent of the modal model provided a basis upon which to 
conceptualize working memory as a distinct function of memory. Thus, it is not surprising that 
working memory research advanced substantially in its wake. The modal model hypothesized that 
a short-term storage component, identified with working memory, mediated sensory processes 
and long-term memory. Each component of memory, such as perception, the short-term store, and 
the long-term store, was conceptualized as a gate in a series through which information must pass 
in order to be represented in the next stage of information processing. The modal model has been 
criticized for lacking mechanisms to explain certain observations, such as why information in the 
short-term store is not necessarily passed to long-term memory as a function of storage duration 
(e.g., Craik & Watkins, 1973, see also, Craik, Routh, & Broadbent, 1983). The model also 
struggles to explain why disruption of early stages, such as short-term memory, can have little 
effect on subsequent functions, such as long-term memory (Baddeley, 2007).   
Baddeley’s Model. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a new model (sometimes referred to as the 
Multicomponent Model) in place of short-term memory in the multi-store model. Now most 
closely associated with Baddeley (1974, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2010), this model distinguishes 
working memory from short-term memory and long-term memory by noting its reliance on 
conscious effort in order to hold an object in active storage (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999). Baddeley has described four components to the model, three which store 
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information and one which executes conscious control of the other systems (i.e., the central 
executive). The first storage system, the phonological loop, is a store for verbal-linguistic 
information. The second is the visuospatial sketchpad, a parallel storage system which handles 
mental images and spatial information. The central executive is described as a relay station 
executing control over the flow of information in and out of the other systems (Barrett, Tugade, & 
Engle, 2004). Later modifications of the model included a fourth subsystem, the episodic buffer, 
which stores integrated visual and verbal information (Baddeley, 2010).  
Research supporting the distinction between the domain specific components, the 
phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad, has consistently found that material stored 
within one component competes with the storage of other material within it, but minimally 
interferes with information stored in the other (e.g., Alloway, Pickering, & Gathercole, 2006; 
Gruber & von Carmon, 2003). For example, one study investigated neural activity during an item 
recognition task with verbal or visuospatial rehearsal conditions (Gruber & von Cramon, 2003). 
These tasks also were administered with and without a secondary task in which subjects engaged 
in articulatory or visuospatial suppression. Differential patterns of activation supported the 
distinction between the verbal and visuospatial components of working memory. Similarly, 
researchers have suggested that the phonological and visuospatial components themselves may 
comprise multiple functions. Logie’s (1995) research examining the visuospatial sketchpad noted 
relatively independent functions for storing the visuospatial features. The visual cache stores 
information about form, color, and other static features, whereas spatial orientation is processed 
by a component known as the inner scribe. Research tasks using dual-tasks within only one of 
these components reveal greater competition than dual-tasks which use both (Klauer & Zhao, 
2004). Brain-imaging research provides additional support for the distinction between these 
components by suggesting that they utilize different areas of the brain (e.g., Gruber & von 
Cramon, 2003; Smith & Jonides, 1997). 
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Several researchers have examined the functions of the central executive (e.g., Smith & 
Jonides, 1999; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). Miyake and colleagues 
(2000; Friedman & Miyake, 2004) used latent variable analysis to identify three functions of the 
central executive: inhibition of pre-potent actions, shifting attentional resources between tasks, 
and updating information in working memory. Posner’s programmatic research of the executive 
function in visual attention identified distinct neural regions responsible for disengaging attention 
from an object and controlling voluntary eye movements (Posner & Fan, 2004; Posner & Raichle, 
1994). Such studies have clarified the role of working memory in effortful behaviors which may 
be important for understanding attentional biases in SAD. 
Anxiety and Working Memory. 
Several theories have emerged to explain the relationship between anxiety and working 
memory (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Sarason, 1988). 
These models share a basis in the Yerkes-Dodson Law (1908), which posits a quadratic 
relationship between arousal and performance such that performance is optimal at moderate 
levels of arousal. Although this observation does not explicitly reference memory or attention, its 
predictions were incorporated by later theorists who applied it to working memory. Easterbrook’s 
cue utilization hypothesis (1959) was among the earliest and most basic attempts to describe how 
anxiety affects attention. Easterbrook proposed that anxiety/arousal reduces the ability to attend 
to environmental cues. Easterbrook’s hypothesis preceded extant working memory models, yet it 
utilized observations of working memory’s limited capacity to parsimoniously explain how 
anxiety can interfere with attention.  
Cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1988) extended Easterbrook’s model. This model 
asserted that interference of anxious arousal with performance occurs via increases in self-
preoccupation, which consumes limited working memory resources so that they are offline for 
other tasks which might otherwise use them. Thus, Sarason proposed that anxiety-driven 
cognitions and related working memory deficits are responsible for performance deficits related 
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to anxiety. Cognitive interference theory describes three stages at which anxiety interferes with 
working memory: attention to the environment, information processing, and planning behaviors. 
Although its core predictions have held over time, cognitive interference theory has ceded its 
influence to more recent models which utilize more advanced theories of working memory 
(Eysenck, 2010). 
Building upon cognitive interference theory, the processing efficiency theory (PET; 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) was the first model to incorporate Baddeley’s model of working 
memory. It distinguished between processing efficiency, the cognitive resources utilized for a set 
level of performance, and effectiveness, the accomplishment of task goals. PET stated that worry 
and other cognitions related to anxiety preoccupy the phonological loop, which reduces its 
capacity for other processes. PET also predicted that effectiveness would suffer if the demands 
upon the phonological loop surpass the capacity necessary to maintain performance.  
As Baddeley’s theory garnered more support, research findings suggested the need for 
revisions to PET. Attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck et al, 2007) discarded the hypothesis 
that worry interferes with the phonological loop. Instead, ACT proposed that anxiety disrupts the 
central executive. ACT posited that anxiety increases stimulus-driven attention at the cost of goal-
oriented attention. In other words, resources are dedicated toward threat detection so that they are 
less available for controlling attention. PET’s predictions regarding processing efficiency and 
effectiveness were retained in ACT. This model also made predictions about the components of 
the central executive as described by Miyake and colleagues (2000). Specifically, ACT posited 
that anxiety interferes with the inhibition and shifting functions.  
The application of ACT to social anxiety has been tested in several recent studies (Amir 
& Bomyea, 2011; Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; 
Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009). For example, Amir and Bomyea (2011) found that subjects 
with SAD showed reduced working memory capacity compared to healthy controls for neutral, 
but not threatening, stimuli. Drawing from ACT, they interpreted their findings as indicating 
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benefits in stimulus-driven attention for threat due to anxiety, coupled with general deficits in 
attentional control. Wieser and colleagues (2009) examined subjects high and low in social 
anxiety as they completed an emotional mixed antisaccade task. Subjects were cued to look 
toward (prosaccade) or away from (antisaccade) emotional or neutral faces which appeared to the 
side of a centrally located fixation cross. Results suggested that socially anxious individuals 
displayed more erratic saccades toward all faces compared to the control group in the anti-
saccade condition. The authors interpreted this as evidence of impaired inhibitory control over 
stimulus-driven prosaccades. Similarly, the findings of Judah and colleagues (discussed above) 
suggested that socially anxious individuals utilized greater neural resources for response 
preparation. Thus, research investigating the application of ACT to social anxiety has generally 
been supportive. 
Cowan’s Embedded Processes Model. 
 Cowan’s (1995, 1999) model of working memory is among the most notable competitors 
with Baddeley’s model. Cowan described working memory as the accessibility of cognitive 
processes to awareness. Cowan’s model avoids distinct structures or functions involved in 
working memory by positing that processes associated with working memory operate through 
various embedded components. The broadest component described by Cowan is short-term 
memory, which is conceptualized as activated long term memory. The second is the “focus of 
attention,” a limited capacity component with a ceiling of approximately four items. Cowan 
suggested that the components and their interaction encompass the various functions associated 
with working memory.  
 Theories of attention and working memory are important to cognitive models of SAD. 
Many cognitive processes in these models, including attentional biases, utilize theories of 
attention and working memory. Thus, drawing hypotheses from these theories may be a 
productive strategy for advancing cognitive models of SAD.  
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Event-related Potentials 
One limitation that has faced the majority of studies examining attentional biases is their 
inability to distinguish between stages of attention. Researchers have attempted to do so by 
varying the stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) in dot-probe tasks or by examining discrete time 
windows using eye tracking (Schofield et al., 2012). Within the broader literature of attention, 
researchers have used event-related potentials (ERPs) to measure attentional processes more 
directly. ERPs have several advantages, the most cited of which is their high temporal resolution 
(Luck, 2005). ERPs are derived from the electroencephalogram (EEG), which consists of a 
continuous measurement of summated post-synaptic potentials that are transferred to the scalp via 
volume conduction. Thus, ERPs represent a more direct measure of the neural basis of cognitive 
processes than reaction time or eye tracking. Research also suggests that ERPs may have better 
reliability than certain reaction time tasks and that they may detect biases not evident in 
behavioral data (see Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014). 
EEG is measured with a network of electrodes (typically 9-256) applied to the scalp using 
a standard method to ensure consistent positioning, the most common of which is the 10-20 
system. These electrodes are usually silver chloride, and the EEG is conducted to the electrodes 
via electroconductive gel or sponges soaked in a saline solution. Voltage changes are measured 
between each of the active EEG electrodes and a reference in a more electrically neutral location, 
such as the earlobe or mastoid process. The re-referencing of the EEG to the average of all EEG 
sites or to the average of both mastoids is commonly done to reduce the influence of the reference 
location on the signal (see Keil et al., 2014). The electrical signal is commonly amplified online 
by several orders of magnitude. In order to prevent aliasing, a problem which occurs when the 
sampling rate is insufficient to distinguish between two or more frequencies, the sampling rate 
must be at least double the highest frequency in the EEG, a principle known as the Nyquist-
Shannon Theorem. Thus, a sampling rate between 200 and 1000 Hz is typically used. To further 
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prevent aliasing, an online high pass filter set between .01 and .1 Hz is used. A low pass filter is 
typically set between 35 and 100 Hz to attenuate high frequency signals. Ideally, low pass 
filtering is conducted offline in order to prevent distortions which occur when the entire sample is 
not available. Filters are best applied to the continuous EEG rather than the epoched data for the 
same reason (see Keil et al., 2014).  
ERPs have been a particularly useful tool for examining attention (see Luck & Girelli, 
1998 for a brief review). For example, Sawaki and Luck (2013) asked subjects to complete a 
visual search task which included task-irrelevant cue arrays which were to be ignored. The 
emergence of the distractor positivity (PD), an ERP indicating effortful suppression of attention, 
was present during cue arrays, suggesting that the reorientation of attention from a distractor is 
active rather than passive. The use of ERPs to address the debate regarding the locus of attention 
represents another example of the usefulness of ERPs. Theorists have long debated whether 
individuals can filter incoming information before perceptual processes (i.e., early selection) or 
can only do so after they have been perceived (i.e., late selection; see Luck & Girelli, 1998). In 
support of early selection, various studies using paradigms which include attended and 
unattended areas of the visual field have found voltage differences between attended and 
unattended locations that emerge between 60 and 100 ms (i.e., the P1 and N1; Mangun & 
Hillyard, 1988; Van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977; Eason, Harter, & White, 1969).  
As detailed previously, ERPs have been used to test cognitive models of SAD. One 
limitation of many ERP studies is that that results may be difficult to interpret because many 
components are modulated by various factors, some of which are unknown, some which may be 
aspects of the task itself. For example, the P3 is sensitive to local probability, arousal, and effort 
(see Kok, 2001). Therefore, it is difficult to draw clear inferences about attention from studies in 
which anxious arousal, enhanced effort due to anxiety, and other factors can modulate the ERPs. 
To overcome this limitation, research is needed using ERPs which are minimally contaminated by 
other processes. The contralateral control method is an approach for isolating ERPs which takes 
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advantage of the hemispheric organization of the visual system in order to isolate ERPs 
associated with visual attention from other neural processes (Gratton, 1998). The contralateral 
layout of the visual system results in several ERPs which can be isolated as differences between 
contralateral and ipsilateral activity, including the N2pc and contralateral delay activity. By 
comparing activity in one hemisphere to another within subjects, noise levels are greatly reduced 
(see Luck, 2005). 
N2pc. 
 The N2pc, first observed by Steven Hillyard’s research group (Heinze, Luck, Mangun, & 
Hillyard, 1990; Luck and Hillyard, 1994), has been particularly useful for examining selective 
attention. The N2pc was named for both its negative going voltage (N), onset at approximately 
200 ms post stimulus (2), and posterior contralateral scalp distribution (pc). More precisely, the 
N2pc is maximal at posterior-occipital sites contralateral to the side of the visual field that is 
attended. The N2pc is calculated as a difference wave between laterally corresponding posterior-
occipital sites (i.e., VC – VI , where VC is voltage at contralateral sites and VI is voltage at 
ipsilateral sites; Luck, 2012). Research using magnetoencephalography with EEG has suggested 
that the N2pc represents the activity of neurons in visual cortex, particularly extrastriate and 
inferotemporal areas (Hopf et al., 2000). The visual search paradigm is commonly used to elicit 
the N2pc. In this task, subjects fixate on a centrally located fixation point throughout the study as 
they view a series of stimuli presented to each side of the visual field. Traditionally, these stimuli 
consist of colored or shaded shapes, such as rectangles which may be oriented vertically or 
horizontally. Subjects are given a target stimulus and required to identify the side of the screen on 
which it appears. Alternatively, subjects are cued to attend to one hemifield and report whether 
the target object is present. Studies suggest that the N2pc can be modulated by task irrelevant 
factors, provided that attention is consistently deployed in preferential selection of the hemifield 
which it occupies (e.g., Eimer & Kiss, 2007).  
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 Notably, researchers have used the N2pc to examine attentional biases. For example, a 
visual search task was used to assess whether spider phobics display attentional biases toward 
images of spiders (Weymar et al., 2013). Stimulus arrays included spiders and butterflies as 
targets amongst images of flowers. The results suggested that spider phobics, but not healthy 
controls, showed greater N2pc amplitude for spider versus butterfly targets. In another example 
more germane to the current study, Eimer and Kiss (2007) modified a visual search task so that 
the stimuli consisted of a field of neutral faces with a single fearful face or a field of fearful faces 
with a single neutral face. Participants were instructed to detect changes in the luminance of the 
fixation cross so that the task did not require the allocation of attention to the facial stimuli. 
Nevertheless, the N2pc was present and suggested biased attention toward the side of the visual 
field which contained a fearful face amidst a field of neutral faces. Importantly, a comparison of 
the N2pc and reaction time in a dot-probe task found that reaction time did not evidence biases 
which were indicated by the N2pc (Kappenman et al., 2014). Thus, the N2pc may be sensitive to 
attentional biases not detected in studies relying solely on behavioral data. 
 Contralateral Delay Activity. 
 Researchers have observed a negative waveform that occurs when subjects maintain a 
visual stimulus array in working memory and persists until the information is no longer needed 
(e.g., Klaver, Smid, & Heinze, 1999; see Perez & Vogel, 2012). This activity was more 
systematically explored and labeled the contralateral delay activity (CDA) by Vogel and 
Machizawa (2004). The CDA is typically elicited using a change detection task, in which 
participants view stimulus arrays presented to each side of the visual field with a cue to attend 
toward one side or the other. This cue may be presented before the array, after it, or after a short 
delay. After a retention period which typically lasts 500-900 ms, a test array appears, and subjects 
must report whether there are any changes in task relevant features to the cued side of the visual 
field. The CDA emerges approximately 275 ms after subjects are cued to preferentially maintain 
information from one side of the visual field over the other (Perez & Vogel, 2012). As with the 
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N2pc, foveation on a centrally located fixation cross throughout each trial is critical for eliciting 
the CDA. The CDA is isolated at posterior occipital sites and computed as a difference between 
contralateral and ipsilateral voltage. These similarities to the N2pc reflect their common basis in 
the visual system. Source localization research on the CDA has yet to draw precise conclusions 
about its neural generators. However, limited neuroimaging research using visual working 
memory tasks suggests that the intraparietal sulcus is a likely source of the CDA (Todd & Marois, 
2004; Xu & Chun, 2006), a notion that is consistent with its scalp topography (Perez & Vogel, 
2012). Research suggests that there is a strong correlation (e.g., r = .78; Vogel & Machizawa, 
2004) between working memory capacity as assessed by behavioral performance on a change 
detection task and the change in CDA amplitude from small (i.e., 2) to large (i.e., 4) set sizes. 
Further supporting the hypothesis that the CDA reflects working memory storage, Woodman and 
Vogel (2008) manipulated the instructions about the stimulus information (e.g., color, orientation) 
that should be attended in a change detection task. Although the presented stimuli were identical 
for each condition, the researchers found that subjects who were asked to remember both color 
and orientation showed an additive effect on CDA amplitude at each set size. This is consistent 
with the notion that the CDA reflects quantity of information in working memory storage. 
The temporal course of the CDA strongly supports its relationship to visual working 
memory. Its onset is immediately following the N2pc in conditions where information must be 
maintained over time, and its offset occurs when this information is no longer needed. Although 
the CDA does not have a clear peak, it typically reaches its maximum amplitude about 450 ms 
after the stimulus array is presented (Perez & Vogel, 2012). This latency is affected by storage 
demands such that it is delayed approximately 42 ms per stored item, a finding that is consistent 
with research suggesting that working memory consolidation is delayed 30-50 ms per object 
(Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2006; see also Perez & Vogel, 
2012).  
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Vogel and colleagues have engaged in a series of elegant experiments designed to 
systematically evaluate alternative explanations for the CDA. The breadth of attention 
confounded early results because larger set sizes resulted in stimulus arrays which occupied a 
broader visual angle. Therefore it was unclear to what extent the CDA was driven by working 
memory load versus spatial scope. McCollough, Machizawa, and Vogel (2007) manipulated the 
space between stimuli in order to control the breadth of the stimulus field and observed that this 
did not modulate the CDA. A second alternative explanation was that the CDA reflects arousal or 
effort, a potential confound of increasing the stimulus set size. To test this, Vogel and colleagues 
used larger set sizes consisting of 6, 8, and 10 stimuli. They predicted that the CDA should 
asymptotically reach capacity limits at approximately four items if due to working memory or 
continue to demonstrate differences at increasing set sizes if due to arousal/effort (McCollough et 
al., 2007; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Their findings, that CDA amplitude did not differ between 
set sizes greater than four, suggests that the CDA is not modulated by task difficulty or arousal. 
One use of the CDA that may be particularly important for the SAD attentional bias 
literature is the examination of the maintenance of task-irrelevant information. Vogel, 
McCollough, and Machizawa (2005) examined this using a change detection task with 
dichotomously colored stimuli and instructions to attend only to stimuli which were one of the 
colors. Trials included either to-be-attended stimuli only or a mix of these stimuli with other-
colored distractors. They found that working memory capacity predicted inefficient storage, as 
indicated by larger CDA for trials containing distractors, which suggests the storage of task-
irrelevant information. In another study, Williams and Woodman (2012, experiment 3) modified 
a change detection task so that the cue to attend only one side of the visual field was presented 
after a short delay following each stimulus array. This allowed them to assess the CDA without 
task demands to preferentially store information on either side of the visual field (i.e., uncued 
CDA) as well as to measure the CDA after being cued to do so (i.e., cued CDA). They found that 
the CDA was only present following the cues, suggesting that subjects did not prioritize either 
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side of the visual field in working memory unless directed to do so. This approach is useful to the 
current study in that it enables the evaluation of biases in working memory in both undirected and 
directed conditions. 
Other researchers have extended this use of the CDA to examine questions pertinent to 
psychopathology. For example, Owens, Derakshan, and Koster (2012) found that subjects high in 
dysphoric symptoms displayed lower working memory capacity and reduced filtering of 
irrelevant information compared to non-dysphoric controls. Another study examined filtering 
efficiency of threat-related distractors in groups of subjects high or low in trait anxiety (Stout et 
al., 2013). Both groups displayed storage of threatening distractors, but this effect was larger for 
anxious subjects. Thus, the utility of the CDA for examining automatic storage of task-irrelevant 
information may be useful for determining whether socially anxious individuals preferentially 
store socially threatening information in working memory. 
Current Study 
 Evidence supports the predictions of cognitive models that socially anxious individuals 
preferentially select threatening information in the environment. However, the literature is 
inconclusive with respect to subsequent attentional deployment. Furthermore, the majority of 
previous studies have relied upon methodologies which do not measure attention directly. These 
studies are further limited by a reliance on approaches with poor temporal resolution, such as the 
dot-probe task. Thirdly, studies have not examined the prediction that self-focused attention 
moderates these biases, despite this hypothesis being explicit in cognitive models. The objective 
of the current study is to use lateralized ERPs to address these gaps and advance the state of the 
evidence with respect to cognitive theories of SAD. 
The aim of the current study is to examine attentional biases in the selection and 
maintenance of socially threatening facial expressions. A secondary goal is to examine how these 
biases are affected by self-focused attention. The study will use a novel modification of the 
change detection task, which allows for the examination of working memory maintenance with 
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and without task demands. Attentional biases will be assessed at two stages using ERPs which are 
well-validated for this purpose. The N2pc will be used to examine early biases in selection, and 
the CDA will be used to evaluate later biases in working memory maintenance.  
 It is predicted that socially anxious subjects will display selection bias for evaluative 
faces as indicated by larger N2pc amplitude for disgust compared to neutral faces. This bias is 
expected to persist after the offset of the face stimuli as socially anxious subjects show biases in 
working memory maintenance of threatening material as indicated by CDA amplitude. Following 
instructions to attend to one side of the visual field, it is expected that socially anxious subjects 
will show smaller CDA for attend neutral trials relative to controls, indicating that neural 
resources are being allocated for storage of task-irrelevant threatening material on the opposite 
side of the visual field. It is predicted that they also will display larger CDA amplitude for attend 
threat trials compared to controls. Both of these predictions are in line with the hypothesis that 
socially anxious subjects display late attentional biases toward threat (i.e., difficulty disengaging 
attention). The self-focus (i.e., false heart rate feedback) manipulation is expected to interact with 
social anxiety group such that the hypothesized effects are enhanced for socially anxious, but not 
non-anxious, subjects. This is consistent with data which suggest that working memory load leads 
to difficulty disengaging attention from threat (see Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013). 
Alternatively, self-focus may reduce attentional biases in selection and maintenance for external 
cues, including those which are threatening, resulting in a reduced N2pc and CDA for threat (see 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark & McManus, 2002). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
 The sample was recruited from the undergraduate student body of a large Midwestern 
university using an online research participation system through which students obtain course 
credit. The sample consisted of 26 females (62%) and 16 males (see Table 1). Thirty-five 
participants identified as Caucasian (83.3%), three as African-American (7.1%), one as Native 
American (2.4%), one as bi-racial (2.4%) and two preferred not to respond (4.8%). Scores on the 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) were used in an extreme groups approach. Participants 
completed the SIAS as part of a screener for the online research participation system. Those with 
scores falling within group cutoff scores were allowed to sign-up for the study voluntarily and 
were recruited using e-mail. The SIAS was administered a second time, along with other self-
report measures, prior to the experiment, and these scores were used to divide the sample into 
social anxiety groups. In line with similar studies (e.g., Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013; 
Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013), subjects scoring one standard deviation or greater above 
the mean reported for the original normalization of the measure (Mattick & Clarke, 1998) were 
considered high in social anxiety (HSA). Those scoring below the mean constituted the low social 
anxiety (LSA) group. A power analysis using effect sizes from similar studies (Stout et al., 2013; 
Owens et al., 2012) and Cohen’s (1988) procedures suggested that 15 - 18 subjects were needed
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for each group. 
Materials 
 Demographics Form. A brief questionnaire was used to obtain information about each 
participant’s sex, race, education, and other pertinent demographic data. 
 Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). This is a self-report 
measure of fears related to social interactions. It consists of 20 Likert scale items ranging from 
“0” to “4” with higher scores reflecting higher levels of social anxiety. The SIAS is currently 
among the most commonly used self-report measures of social anxiety, and psychometric studies 
support its validity and reliability (Osman, Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros, 1998). Internal 
consistency was excellent for this study (Cronbach’s α = .94). 
 Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003). The 
ASBQ is a self-report measure of anticipatory processing about upcoming social situations. It 
consists of 12 items with response options ranging from “1” to “4” with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of anticipatory processing. Mills and colleagues (2013) identified two correlated 
subscales which they labeled “Preparation” and “Avoidance,” the latter of which was more 
closely associated with maladaptive behaviors. Internal consistency was good for the overall scale 
(α = .88) and for the Avoidance (α = .81) subscale, and acceptable for the Preparation subscale (α 
= .79).  
 Focus of Attention Questionnaire (FAQ; Woody, 1996). The FAQ consists of 10 items 
ranging from “0” to “10” which evaluate the extent to which one attends to thoughts, 
physiological changes, and behaviors while delivering a speech. Following the approach used by 
Mills and colleagues (2013), each item was altered to assess attention during a general social 
interaction. Internal consistency was high (α = .82). 
 Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The ACS consists of 20 self-
report items which assess executive control of attention. Judah, Grant, Mills, and Lechner (2014) 
identified two correlated subscales, “Focusing” and “Shifting” which demonstrated discriminant 
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and predictive validity. The latter subscale correlated with working memory capacity as assessed 
by a letter-number sequencing task. Internal consistency was good for the overall scale (α = .84) 
and inhibition subscale (α = .83), and acceptable for the shifting subscale (α = .68). 
 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II assesses 
symptoms of depression using 21 self-report items ranging from “0” to “3” with higher scores 
reflecting greater severity. Research supports the reliability and validity of the BDI-II (Storch, 
Roberti, & Roth, 2004). Internal consistency was high for the present study (α = .85). 
 Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (Taylor et al., 2007). The ASI-III is a revised version of the 
original ASI (Peterson & Reiss, 1992), which was designed to assess fear of somatic sensations 
related to arousal and anxiety. The ASI-3 includes 18 items arranged in three empirically derived 
subscales which measure Physical, Cognitive, and Social Concerns. Research supports the 
convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity of the ASI-III (Taylor et al., 2007). 
Internal consistency was good for the overall measure (α = .89), as well as for the Physical (α = 
.83) and Cognitive Concerns (α = .85) subscales. Internal consistency was acceptable for the 
Social Concerns subscale (α = .79). 
 The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, Letter-number Sequencing Subtest (Wechsler, 
1997). This task involves hearing lists of letters and numbers and reciting the numbers first in 
numerical order followed by the letters in alphabetical order. Participants complete a maximum of 
21 lists with set sizes that range from two to eight. The test is immediately discontinued if 
mistakes are made on all three lists for a set size. Research supports the validity of this task as a 
measure of working memory capacity (see Crowe, 2000). 
 The Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). This is a freely available online 
collection of facial stimuli which have been developed and standardized for use in cognitive 
tasks. The database was developed to avoid differences between images in terms of luminance, 
distance of faces from the camera, idiosyncratic emotional expressions, and other common 
sources of unintended variance in facial stimulus sets. The database includes eight emotional 
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expressions imaged from five viewing angles with eye gaze toward subject or averted to either 
side. All frontal view images have been validated with standardized ratings for emotional 
expression, attractiveness, intensity, clarity, and genuineness. This study utilized disgust and 
neutral faces from a frontal view with direct eye gaze. Disgust faces were used as social 
evaluative threat stimuli because studies suggest that socially anxious individuals perceive them 
as more threatening than other emotional faces, such as those depicting anger (Amir et al. 2005; 
Amir, Najmi, Bomyea, & Burns, 2010). In order to remove irrelevant features (i.e., neck, 
shoulders, and space around the head) and maximize the size of facial stimuli, each stimulus was 
cropped to a  rectangle with a .73:1 width to height ratio. 
Procedure 
 All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board. Following informed 
consent, participants completed all self-report measures online followed by a letter-number 
sequencing task and the experiment, a modified change detection task (see Fig. 1). Stimulus array 
positioning, presentation times, and other features of the change detection task were modeled 
after similar studies (Owens et al., 2012; Stout et al., 2013). Studies examining the CDA typically 
employ approximately 200 trials per condition (Owens et al., 2012; Qi, Ding, & Li, 2013; Sessa, 
Luria, Gotler, Jolicoeur, & Dell’Acqua, 2010; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004; Vogel et al., 2005; 
2006; Woodman & Vogel, 2008). Artifact detection was expected to result in the rejection of as 
many as 25% of trials (Owens et al., 2012; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Thus, it was determined 
that the current study should consist of at least 1000 trials. To allow for an equal number of 
stimulus presentations in each condition, 1024 trials were needed. In order to avoid participant 
fatigue and minimize movement potentials, eight blocks consisting of 128 trials were 
administered with 20 second breaks following trials 42 and 84 within each block. Additionally, 
breaks of at least 60 seconds were taken between blocks (see McCollough et al., 2007; Woodman 
& Vogel, 2008). Participants were allowed to press a button at any time after the 60 second 
breaks to begin the next block. 
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 Stimuli were presented on a Dell 19 inch LCD monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Each 
subject was seated so that the nasion was 70 cm from the monitor. The height of the monitor was 
adjusted so that its center aligned with each subject’s line of sight. Stimulus presentation and 
event logging were controlled using PsychoPy (version 1.80; Peirce, 2007) and synched with the 
refresh rate of the monitor to ensure precise timing. Participants were given the following 
instructions prior to the task: “For this task you will see pictures of faces appearing on each side 
of the screen. After the faces disappear, you will be asked to remember the faces on one side of 
the screen. The faces will appear again, and you will indicate whether the identity of any of the 
faces on that side of the screen changed. Please press the (left/right trigger) if there is a change 
and the (left/right trigger) if there is not.” Participants then completed 14 monitored practice trials 
with automated feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”). For each trial, a fixation symbol (+) 
appeared in the center of the monitor throughout the experiment, and participants were told to 
look at it throughout the study and to minimize eye movements. Participants were given random 
false heart rate feedback on 50% of trials. Specifically, they were told that an “×” would appear 
instead of the standard fixation symbol (i.e., +) if their heart rate increased. The psychological 
meaning of these symbols was counter-balanced across subjects to avoid the difference in the 
physical characteristics of the stimuli from becoming a confound (Luck, 2005). Each trial began 
with a centrally located fixation symbol or false heart rate symbol presented for 700 ms. This 
fixation symbol remained present throughout the remainder of the trial and retained its 
orientation. After this, a stimulus array consisting of two face pictures was presented on each side 
of the screen for 200 ms. The pictures on one side of the screen displayed disgust faces, and the 
other side displayed neutral faces. All faces were taken from the Radboud database (Langner et 
al., 2010). Each face picture had a 4.6o horizontal offset from the fixation symbol and resided 
within a visual field of 13.9o × 6.5o. The visual angle subtended by the fixation symbol was 1.2 o, 
while that of each face picture was 4.7 o × 6.5o. These measurements are comparable to previous 
research examining the N2pc and CDA (Stout et al., 2013; Owens et al., 2012; Vogel & 
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Machizawa, 2004). The N2pc was measured from an epoch event-locked to presentation of the 
face stimulus array. Following stimulus presentation, the fixation symbol remained without other 
stimuli for 600 ms, during which time the uncued CDA was measured. After this, an arrow 
pointing to the right or left (equal probability) appeared in the center of the screen for 100 ms, 
followed by presentation of the fixation symbol by itself for 600 ms, during which time the cued 
CDA was measured. After this, the test array appeared for 800 ms or until a response was made, 
whichever occurred first. Test arrays were identical to stimulus arrays for 50% of trials or had one 
face changed on the side indicated by the arrow for the other 50% of trials. Intertrial intervals 
varied randomly using latencies ranging from 600 - 900 ms. 
Electrophysiological Recording 
 Electroencephalographic (EEG), electrocardiographic (ECG), and electrooculographic 
(EOG) data were collected using an Active II system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). 
EEG data were collected from thirty-two channels (Fp1, Fp2, AF3, AF4, F7, F3, FZ, F4, F8, FC5, 
FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, CZ, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, PZ, P4, P8, PO3, PO4, O1, 
OZ, and O2) positioned using the 10/20 system. Online referencing was done using two 
electrodes, the Common Mode Sense active (CMS) and Driven Right Leg passive (DRL) 
electrodes. These electrodes are part of BioSemi’s basic design and substantially reduce both the 
common mode potential and the impedance of the ground. Electrodes were placed on each 
mastoid for offline re-referencing. To measure ECG, an active electrode was attached to the left 
side of the chest approximately six inches below the arm pit, and a passive electrode was attached 
to the ventral side of the trapezius. To record vertical eye movements and blinks an electrode was 
placed one centimeter below the left eye. Electrodes were placed one centimeter beyond the outer 
canthus of each eye to measure horizontal eye movements. 
Electrophysiological Data Preparation  
Data were sampled at 256 Hz and filtered online with a .01 – 100 Hz band pass filter. 
EEG data were filtered offline with a band pass filter of .1 – 30 Hz (12 dB/oct. roll-off) and 
43 
referenced to the average of the mastoids. EEGLAB, version 11 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB, version 4.0 (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2013) were used to process the data. 
Independent components analysis (ICA), a commonly used computational procedure for isolating 
orthogonal, additive components of a signal, was used to correct for ocular artifact in the 
continuous data, which were then epoched by trial, beginning at 400 ms prior to the onset of the 
fixation cross and ending 800 ms after the presentation of the test array (3000 ms after fixation 
cross onset). The mean amplitude during the 200 ms prior to the most recent stimulus onset was 
subtracted to baseline the data. Automated routines in ERPLAB were used to remove trials 
containing artifact. Trials containing blinks within 200 ms of the onset of the fixation cross, 
stimulus array, directional cue, or test array were excluded, as were trials containing saccades 
during the period between the onset of the stimulus and test arrays. Additionally, a routine was 
used to detect and exclude trials with voltage changes exceeding 200 µV at any electrode within a 
200 ms window which stepped across each trial in 50 ms increments. This process was repeated 
using a cutoff of 100 µV for electrodes at which measurements were taken (i.e., PO3/4, P3/4, 
O1/2), which were selected based on previous research which analyzes the N2pc and CDA. These 
ERP components were evaluated by comparing voltage between contralateral and ipsilateral 
electrodes as measured from the pooled occipito-parietal electrodes (P3/4, PO3/4, and O1/2). 
Electrodes were averaged with their laterally corresponding locations depending on which 
hemifield contained the stimulus being evaluated. For example, contralateral waveforms for 
disgust faces were averaged from electrodes on the right side of the scalp when disgust faces 
appeared in the left hemifield along with electrodes on the left side of the scalp when disgust 
faces appeared in the right hemifield. Mean amplitude within the 200-300 ms post-stimulus 
measurement window (Kiss, Van Velzen, & Eimer, 2008) was used to evaluate N2pc amplitude. 
Uncued and cued CDA amplitudes were assessed as the mean amplitudes from 300 ms post-
stimulus until the onset of the next stimulus (i.e., 300-800 ms for uncued CDA, 300-700 ms for 
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cued CDA; Vogel et al., 2005). Scalp maps representing mean amplitude within these windows 
were examined to verify that ERPs were maximal at occipito-parietal sites, as expected. 
 
Manipulation Check 
 Previous research using pseudo heart rate feedback has included three post-task questions 
to verify that participants knew the meaning of the feedback stimulus and that it affected self-
focus (Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2002). Following these 
studies, participants were asked an open-ended question after the experiment about what caused 
the computer glitch. Subjects also were asked to report how much this affected self-consciousness 
and interfered with performance using a 0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) scale. To evaluate 
differential attention to self-focus cues, the P1, an ERP which emerges at approximately 100 ms 
and is maximal at occipito-parietal sites, was examined. Research suggests that P1 amplitude is 
enhanced when subjects are vigilant for an upcoming stimulus which appears in the attended 
location (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998).  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
 It was hypothesized that N2pc amplitude would be larger at scalp sites contralateral to 
disgust faces for socially anxious subjects compared to non-anxious individuals, who were  
expected to show little to no N2pc amplitude. This would suggest greater selective attention for 
disgust compared to neutral facial expressions in socially anxious subjects. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 Uncued CDA amplitude was expected to be larger for disgust faces for the socially 
anxious group compared to the low anxious group, who were expected to show little if any CDA. 
This would suggest preferential maintenance of disgust compared to neutral facial expressions in 
the absence of task-related maintenance demands. 
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Hypothesis 3 
 Cued CDA amplitude was expected to be smaller for the socially anxious compared to 
the control group for “attend neutral” trials and larger for “attend disgust” trials. The first finding 
would suggest that socially anxious individuals have difficulty ignoring disgust facial 
expressions. The latter finding would suggest enhanced working memory maintenance for disgust 
faces when it is consistent with task demands. 
Hypothesis 4 
 Self-focus trials, which include false heart rate feedback, were expected to interact with 
group such that the hypothesized effects would be exacerbated for the socially anxious group and 
not for controls. Cognitive theories are partially discrepant in predictions about how self-focused 
attention affects external attention. It is possible that self-focus reduces external attention, 
including attention toward threat cues. Another possibility is that self-focus results in working 
memory load and thereby leads to difficulty filtering threatening information from working 
memory (see Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013).   
46 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Preliminary Group Comparisons 
 There were no significant differences between the LSA and HSA groups in terms of 
demographic variables, task response rate, task performance, or working memory capacity as 
measured by letter-number sequencing. The number of trials retained and rejected did not differ 
between groups for any trial type (all ts < 1.30, ps > .22. In contrast to previous research (e.g., 
Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013), the groups did not differ in self-ratings of how much the 
self-focus manipulation made them more self-conscious and interfered with their performance. 
The HSA group scored significantly higher than the LSA group on the ASBQ and its subscales, 
the FAQ, the BDI-II, and the ASI-3 and its subscales, but lower on the ACS and its subscales (see 
Table 1). 
Analytic Strategy 
 Prior to the main analyses, the success of the self-focus manipulation was evaluated by 
examining P1 amplitude differences for the standard and self-focus fixation symbols between 
groups. The current study used a mixed factorial design consisting of a between groups factor, 
Group (HSA, LSA)], and two within-subjects factors, Condition (Self-focus, No self-focus)] and 
Laterality (Contra, Ipsi), as well as three dependent variables (amplitudes of the N2pc, uncued 
CDA, cued CDA). For the cued CDA, there was an additional within-subjects factor, Target 
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(Disgust, Neutral). Thus, three repeated measures ANOVAs were used to evaluate the data.  
Significant interactions were probed using simple effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustments.
 Before conducting the analyses, the data were evaluated to ensure data quality and that 
the assumptions of ANOVA were met. Missing self-report data were replaced with the series 
mean for each subject, provided that less than 5% was missing per questionnaire (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). No subject had more than 5% missing data for any measure. Because ANOVA is 
sensitive to outliers, it was planned that dependent measures with Z scores above 3.29 would be 
excluded. However, there were no cases of outliers. Assumptions for ANOVA include sampling 
distribution normality, homogeneity of variance, and sphericity. The normality assumption was 
tested by examining the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals, with the assumption supported by 
values below 2.0 and 4.0, respectively (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Skewness and kurtosis 
values were within acceptable limits for the N2pc and uncued CDA. For the cued CDA, the 
residuals for disgust targets on self-focus trials were slightly negatively skewed for both 
ipsilateral (-2.02) and contralateral sites (-2.14). Additionally, there was evidence of kurtosis of 
the residuals for sites contralateral to disgust targets on standard trials (4.33), both contralateral 
(5.91) and ipsilateral sites (6.35) for disgust targets on self-focus trials, and for ipsilateral sites for 
neutral targets on self-focus trials (4.07). Thus, the normality assumption for the cued CDA was 
considered questionable. The normality assumption also rests on balanced sample sizes between 
groups and the use of two-tailed tests, both of which were the case in the present study. Fmax was 
used to assess homogeneity of variance, with values below 10 supporting the assumption. All 
values were below 10 (N2pc = 1.84, uncued CDA = 3.33, cued CDA = 6.07). Assuming 
sphericity was unnecessary because all factors consisted of only two levels. 
 Effect sizes for significant effects were calculated using η2 and Cohen’s d. Conventions 
for interpreting η2 are that effect sizes above .26 are large, those less than this and above .13 are 
medium, and those below this and above .02 are small. Cohen’s d is conventionally interpreted as 
large if .80 or greater, medium if .50 or greater, and small if .20 or greater.  
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Manipulation Check 
All subjects who were included in the analyses recalled that the change in the fixation 
symbol was a software glitch which indicated that their heart rate had accelerated. Subjects 
reported moderate increases in self-consciousness (M = 2.98, SD = 1.80) and interference (M = 
2.69, SD = 1.98) when heart rate cues were presented. Pooled occipito-parietal sites (OZ, O1/2, 
PO3/4) were examined within the 75-125 ms window to evaluate the P1 following the onset of 
fixation symbols. A 2 [Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (Standard, Self-Focus)] mixed 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for Condition, F(1,40) = 5.13 p = 03, p2 = .10, such that P1 
amplitude was larger for heart rate cues (M = .47, SD = 1.21) compared to standard fixation 
symbols (M = .16, SD = 1.36; d = .24). There also was a main effect for Group, F(1,40) = 6.45, p 
= .014, p2 = .12, suggesting that HSA subjects displayed a larger P1 (M = .79, SD = 1.24) 
compared to LSA subjects (M = -.16, SD = 1.17; d = .79). The interaction between Group and 
Condition was not significant, F < 1.0. These analyses supported the manipulation by suggesting 
that 1) subjects were more vigilant for self-focus cues than for standard fixation symbols and 2) 
HSAs were more vigilant than LSAs for the fixation symbols in general. 
Primary Analyses 
Analyses of the N2pc and uncued CDA were conducted on pooled occipito-parietal sites 
P3/P4, PO3/PO4, and O1/O2. A 2 [Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (Standard, Self-Focus)] x 
2 [Laterality (Contralateral, Ipsilateral)] mixed ANOVA was used to test early biased attention 
for disgust faces (see Fig. 3). There was a significant three way interaction of Group, Condition, 
and Laterality, F(1,40) = 7.72, p < .01, p2 = .16, such that HSA subjects showed greater 
negativity at sites contralateral (M = 2.03, SD = 3.85) than sites ipsilateral to disgust faces for 
standard trials (M = 2.20, SD = 3.88; p = .01, p2 = .16), but not when self-focus cues were 
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present, p = .24. In contrast, LSA subjects showed marginally significant negativity at 
contralateral (M = 1.75, SD = 3.95) relative to ipsilateral sites (M = 1.88, SD = 3.94, p = .06, p2 = 
.08) for disgust faces for self-focus trials, but not standard trials, p = .76. Thus, HSA subjects 
showed an N2pc supporting early biased selective attention for disgust faces, but not when self-
focus cues were present, whereas LSA subjects showed a marginally significant bias only when 
the self-focus cues were present. There were no other significant main effects or interactions.  
For the uncued CDA, there was a significant three way interaction of Group, Condition, 
and Laterality, F(1,40) = 5.43, p = .025, p2 = .12 (see Fig. 4). Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
indicated that on standard trials, HSAs showed greater contralateral (M = .66, SD = 2.38) than 
ipsilateral negativity (M = .84, SD = 2.40) for disgust faces, p < .01, p2 = .16, but this effect was 
not present for trials with self-focus cues, p = .16, nor was it significant for LSA subjects for trials 
with self-focus cues, p = .53, or without them, p = .96. No other comparisons, main effects, or 
interactions were significant. 
  A 2 [Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (No Self-Focus, Self-Focus)] x 2 [Target 
(Disgust, Neutral) x 2 [Laterality (Contralateral, Ipsilateral)] mixed ANOVA was used to test 
how biased attention competes with task instructions as measured by the cued CDA (see Figs. 4 
& 5). There was a marginally significant main effect for Laterality, F(1,40) = 3.93, p = .054, p2 = 
.09. This was qualified by an interaction between Group and Laterality, F(1,40) = 5.11, p = .029, 
p2 = .11. Unexpectedly, LSA subjects showed greater negativity at sites ipsilateral to targets (M 
= .80, SD = 2.15) than at contralateral sites (M = 1.09, SD = 2.27; p = .004, p2 = .19). No 
significant pairwise comparisons were found for the HSA group, nor were there other significant 
main effects or interactions. 
 Supplementary Analyses 
Examination of the arrow-locked ERP waveform containing the cued CDA suggested the 
presence of the N2pc. Analysis of the second N2pc was done on pooled voltage at P3/P4, 
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PO3/PO4, and O1/O2. A 2 [Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (No Self-Focus, Self-Focus)] x 2 
[Target (Disgust, Neutral) x 2 [Laterality (Contralateral, Ipsilateral)] mixed ANOVA was used to 
examine the N2pc. There was a main effect for Laterality, F(1,40) = 5.98, p = .02, p2 = .13, such 
that subjects showed greater negativity at sites contralateral (M = 2.57, SD = 2.29) than sites 
ipsilateral to targets (M = 2.70, SD = 2.34). Thus, subjects showed biased selective attention for 
the hemifield indicated by the arrow. 
 The test array at the end of each trial provided an additional opportunity to examine the 
N2pc and sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN). The N2pc was evaluated using a 2 
[Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (No Self-Focus, Self-Focus)] x 2 [Target (Disgust, Neutral) 
mixed ANOVA with the difference wave (contra minus ipsi) as the dependent variable. For the 
N2pc, there was a marginally significant main effect for Group, F(1,40) = 3.98, p = .053, p2= 
.09, such that LSA subjects trended toward a larger N2pc for targets (M = -.24, SD = .91) relative 
to HSA subjects (M = .16, SD = .96). There was also a marginally significant interaction between 
Group and Laterality, F(1,40) = 3.98, p = .053, p2 = .09. These effects were qualified by a 
significant three way interaction between all factors, F(1,40) = 4.64, p = .037, p2 = .10. Follow-
up pairwise comparisons of the difference waves suggested that for self-focus trials, HSA 
subjects showed a significantly more positive N2pc for neutral targets (M = .40, SD = .79) 
compared to disgust targets (M = .027, SD = .76; p = .008, d = .48, p2 = .16). This positive N2pc 
indicates greater voltage at sites contralateral to distractors relative to ipsilateral sites, indicating 
greater attentional bias for disgust compared to neutral distractors. 
A 2 [Group (HSA, LSA)] x 2 [Condition (No Self-Focus, Self-Focus)] x 2 [Target 
(Disgust, Neutral) x 2 [Laterality (Contralateral, Ipsilateral)] mixed ANOVA was used to evaluate 
the CDA for faces in the test array. There was a main effect for Laterality, F(1,40) = 12.40, p < 
.001, p2 = .24, suggesting that subjects showed greater negative voltage at electrodes contralateral 
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to targets (M = 3.36, SD = .58) relative to ipsilateral electrodes (M = 3.68, SD = .58; d = -.55). 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As hypothesized, socially anxious subjects, but not controls, showed a bias for disgust 
facial expressions as indicated by enhanced N2pc amplitude. Further, this bias persisted in 
working memory after these faces disappeared, as indicated by greater CDA amplitude. Contrary 
to the hypothesis, biased preference for threat was not evident after participants were cued to 
attend to one hemifield. Instead, an unexpected effect was observed, namely, that individuals with 
low levels of social anxiety showed a reverse CDA effect for targets that was not present for 
socially anxious subjects. In the context of self-focus cues, socially anxious subjects did not show 
a bias for disgust faces as indicated by N2pc or CDA amplitude. Unexpectedly, control subjects 
displayed a bias for disgust faces when self-focus cues were present, but this bias did not persist 
in working memory, as indicated by lack of an effect on the CDA. 
Discussion of Findings 
The results support and advance cognitive models of social anxiety disorder. Biased 
attention toward social threat is a cornerstone of these theories, but only a handful of studies have 
tested this using ERPs as a direct measure of attention and working memory. Previous studies 
have evaluated enhanced P1 amplitude (e.g., Mueller et al., 2009; Kolassa et al., 2007, Peschard 
et al., 2013), P3 amplitude (Moser et al., 2008), and other components (e.g., van der Molen et al., 
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2013) in socially anxious subjects to investigate attentional biases. A review of the 
literature suggested that this is the first study to investigate attentional biases in social anxiety 
using lateralized ERPs, specifically, the N2pc and CDA. The results suggest that this approach 
may aid in resolving unanswered questions about relationships between cognitive processes and 
social anxiety. 
A key finding of this study is that socially anxious subjects show biases in selective 
attention (N2pc) and working memory maintenance (uncued CDA) for disgust relative to neutral 
faces and that individuals low in social anxiety do not. This is generally in line with other studies, 
which have found that socially anxious subjects exhibit early attentional biases (e.g., Peschard et 
al., 2013). The current study furthers this literature by examining biases in selection for disgust 
faces from a visual array which also contained neutral faces. Additionally, the uncued CDA 
findings advance the field by suggesting that socially anxious individuals preferentially maintain 
disgust faces in working memory even after they are no longer present. This sustained bias in 
working memory may be relevant to the ongoing question of the conditions that affect whether 
socially anxious individuals disengage from social threat stimuli at late stages of processing. The 
current study supports a sustained bias for social threat, although it is unclear whether changes to 
the experimental design might have produced different results. For example, Judah, Grant, 
Lechner, and Mills (2013) found that cognitive load was associated with sustained attention to 
threatening faces. It is possible that the current task, which required participants to store features 
of four faces simultaneously, resulted in high cognitive load, thereby depleting executive 
resources which might be used to disengage attention from threatening stimuli if this load were 
not present. Further research is needed to investigate this and other potential moderators of this 
effect. 
These data also suggest interesting effects of self-focused attention on attentional biases. 
There is a lack of clear consensus among theories (see Schultz & Heimberg, 2008) as to whether 
self-focused attention increases the salience of external social threat stimuli and thereby increases 
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vigilance (Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1998) or reduces the 
availability of attentional resources to process external stimuli (Clark & McManus, 2002; Clark & 
Wells, 1995). This study suggested that the presence of a cue allegedly indicating accelerated 
heart rate resulted in a lack of bias for disgust faces in selective attention (i.e., N2pc) and in 
working memory (i.e., uncued CDA) among socially anxious individuals. This would seem to 
support the prediction that self-focused attention reduces processing of external stimuli. Clark and 
Wells (1995) hypothesized that one mechanism which maintains social phobia is that self-focus 
may prevent processing of external information which would disconfirm social fears. However, it 
also may be posited that self-focus would interfere with processing of ambiguous or socially 
threatening information, which may interfere with habituation and/or new learning in social 
contexts. Thus, self-focus may share features with avoidance behaviors which prevent adaptive 
learning and maintain anxiety.  
Unexpectedly, the self-focus manipulation resulted in marginally significant biased 
selective attention (i.e., N2pc) for disgust faces among the low anxious subjects. This suggests a 
differential effect of the manipulation on attentional biases among individuals high and low in 
social anxiety. Whereas it resulted in reduced bias for the socially anxious subjects, it increased 
this bias in those with low social anxiety. Importantly, this bias was not maintained after the 
offset of the stimulus array, and subjects low in social anxiety did not show biases in working 
memory for disgust faces, even for self-focus trials. The effect of self-focus on the N2pc suggests 
differences in how the groups processed cues that heart rate is elevated. It also may suggest a 
mechanism for the development of social anxiety. Specifically, attention to physiological 
symptoms of anxiety may be involved in the reallocation of attention to detect sources of threat. 
Future research is needed to determine whether this effect is replicable, particularly due to its 
marginal significance. 
Surprisingly, a cued CDA was not evident in this study. It was expected that subjects 
would show greater negativity at contralateral compared to ipsilateral sites for targets in the 
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interval preceding the test array. Counter to this hypothesis, the low social anxiety group showed 
the opposite pattern, namely, greater negativity at ipsilateral than contralateral sites. Although this 
effect was not anticipated, supplementary analyses suggested that both groups showed an N2pc 
for the hemifield to which the arrow cue directed them to attend. Thus, subjects showed early 
selective attention in favor of the hemifield containing target faces. Examination of the 
waveforms suggested that the ipsilateral negativity emerged around 400 ms. There are two 
possible interpretations of what this activity means (see Arend & Zimmer, 2011). First, it may 
indicate preferred working memory storage for distractors, but this seems unlikely, especially 
given the early N2pc preference for targets. A second possibility is that it reflects the ipsilateral 
hemisphere actively suppressing attention to distractors. Although lack of clarity of the 
psychological meaning of the effect means that strong conclusions cannot be drawn, the 
possibility that it represents suppression of distractors is in line with the hypotheses. This 
interpretation also is supported by recent research using a change detection task that noted the 
presence of a similar effect, termed ipsilateral delay activity, when distractors were actively 
inhibited (Arend & Zimmer, 2011). In the case of this study, the ipsilateral delay activity would 
suggest that individuals low in social anxiety were able to suppress distractors regardless of their 
emotional valence, but those high in social anxiety were not. Previous research has suggested that 
anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007), including social anxiety (Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013), is 
associated with impairments in cognitive control. Thus, it may be that subjects high in social 
anxiety were less likely to utilize a memory strategy which involved filtering distractors from 
working memory. Although the implications of the ipsilateral delay activity for the low social 
anxiety group could be informative, only speculation about its meaning is possible at this time.  
Larger P1 amplitude for self-focus cues relative to standard fixation symbols suggests 
that subjects were attuned to the psychological meaning of the cues. These symbols were counter-
balanced across subjects, and each appeared for 50% of trials. Thus, their physical characteristics 
and frequency are ruled out as alternative explanations for the P1 effect. HSA subjects showed 
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larger P1 amplitude for fixation symbols in general compared to LSAs, suggesting greater 
vigilance for the appearance of task irrelevant information about their physiological arousal. 
Unlike previous research which has found that false heart rate feedback increased self-
consciousness and perceived interference in subjects high in social anxiety relative to low socially 
anxious controls (e.g., Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013), these ratings did not differ between 
groups in this study. One possibility is that the relatively frequent presentation (i.e., 50% of trials) 
resulted in greater habituation than in the study conducted by Judah and colleagues (2013), which 
presented this feedback on 20% of trials. 
Limitations 
There are important limitations to these data which should be considered. First, the use of 
a non-clinical, undergraduate sample may be seen as a threat to the generalizability of the 
findings to social anxiety disorder. However, recent perspectives on psychopathology (e.g., 
RDoC) suggest that research is needed which targets understanding symptoms, behavior, and 
neural function rather than diagnostic categories. Additionally, theoretical perspectives consider 
social anxiety as a continuum along which social anxiety disorder represents maladaptively high 
levels of anxiety (Crome, Baillie, Slade, & Ruscio, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Another 
limitation is that conclusions about ERPs, including those made in this study, rely on extensive 
background research documenting their psychological meaning. This presents a particular 
problem for interpreting the cued CDA effect for the low social anxiety group, which evidenced 
ipsilateral negativity. Future studies are needed to clarify this finding and to better understand the 
psychological processes involved in the CDA and other ERPs related to working memory. 
In summary, this study has important theoretical and treatment implications. It resulted in 
clear evidence of attention biases, which supports cognitive models of social anxiety disorder. 
The data address a long-standing uncertainty among theories regarding the effect of self-focused 
attention on external attention to threatening stimuli. New research questions are suggested by the 
results, and these may be useful in continuing to hone cognitive theories. In addition to the 
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theoretical implications of the study, the findings may be important for treatment considerations. 
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for social anxiety disorder, which relies on exposure therapy, 
may benefit from this and other studies which are progressively explicating how attentional 
biases maintain social fears. For example, these data may be taken as part of a building literature 
suggesting that self-focused attention may reduce processing of threat in the environment, which 
may impact the success of exposure. This may suggest that self-focused attention should be 
considered an important target for behavioral interventions for SAD. More research is needed to 
further our understanding of internal and external attentional biases, how they impact treatment, 
and how current CBT may be informed by this information.
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1. Group Comparisons on Demographic, Cognitive, Task, and Symptom Measures 
 HSA Group LSA Group Significance Test 
Variables 
M 
(Count) 
SD  
(%) 
M 
(Count) 
SD  
(%) 
t  
(χ2) 
p 
Sex -- -- -- -- (.77) .38 
Male (9) (45%) (7) (32%)   
Female (11) (55%) (15) (68%)   
Age 19.80 5.34 18.95 1.81 1.91 .18 
Ethnicity -- -- -- -- (4.95) .29 
Caucasian (18) (90.0) (17) (77.3)   
African American (0) (0) (3) (14.6)   
Native American (0) (0) (1) (5.5)   
Bi-racial (1) (5.0) (0) (0)   
No Response  (1) (5.0) (1) (5.5)   
ASBQ 35.10 6.09 24.73 6.30 5.41 < .001 
    Prepare 15.55 2.87 11.64 3.35 4.05 <.001 
    Avoid 13.45 3.00 8.95 3.39 4.53 <.001 
FAQ 27.60 6.45 21.36 5.63 3.35 .002 
ACS 43.50 7.69 52.27 6.66 3.96 <.001 
    Focusing 13.80 3.35 18.55 3.36 4.58 <.001 
    Shifting 11.25 1.94 13.05 2.44 2.62 .012 
BDI-II 14.75 9.18 7.36 6.08 3.10 .004 
ASI-3 35.20 8.64 25.50 7.73 3.84 <.001 
    Physical Concerns 10.50 4.11 8.09 3.04 2.17 .04 
    Cognitive Concerns 10.10 3.42 7.50 3.49 2.44 .02 
    Social Concerns 14.60 4.26 9.91 3.04 4.14 <.001 
Letter-number Seq. 41.21 30.84 35.38 22.59 .77 .45 
Performance .51 .05 .52 .07 .552 .58 
Response Rate .91 .08 .92 .06 .36 .73 
Self-consciousness 3.40 1.70 2.59 1.84 1.48 .15 
Interference 2.95 1.88 2.45 2.09 .81 .43 
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Figure 1. Change Detection Task 
 
87 
Figure 2. P1 event-locked to fixation onset
  
88 
Figure 3. N2pc and uncued CDA event-locked to stimulus array onset 
 
89 
Figure 4. Cued CDA event-locked to arrow onset for standard trials 
 
  
90 
Figure 5. Cued CDA event-locked to arrow onset for self-focus trials 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
 
What is your sex?  1= Male, 2=Female 
 
1. Age:  (years) 
 
2. Year in School:  
 
3. Place of birth:   (please use the following guide) 
1 = USA (mainland) 7 = Asia, South Pacific 
2 = Puerto Rico 8 = Africa 
3 = Dominican Republic 9 = Europe 
4 = Other Caribbean 10 = Other – Specify: 
5 = Mexico   
6 = Central/South America 99 = Don’t know. 
 
         Specify country of birth if it does not appear above: ____________________ 
 
5.   What is your Ethnicity?  
1 = Hispanic/Latino  
2 = Not Hispanic/Latino  
3 = Don’t know  
 
 6.   What is your Race?  
1 = White - not Latino 8 = Mixed (White/Asian) 
2 = African-American 9 = Mixed (other) - Specify: 
3 = Asian   
4 = Native American   
5 = Latino 10 = Other – Specify: 
6 = Mixed (White/African-American)   
7 = Mixed (White/Hispanic) 99 = Don’t know. 
 
7. What is your religious affiliation?  
    
1 = Catholic 6 = None 
2 = Protestant 7 = Other – Specify: 
3 = Jewish   
4 = Jehovah’s Witness   
5 = Muslim 99 = Don’t know 
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8. In all, how many years have you lived in the U.S.?   
 
 
9. Occupational status:  
    
1 = Employed full-time for pay 8 = Unemployed <6 months,  
does not expect to work 
2 = Employed part-time for pay 9 = Unemployed >6 months,  
does not expect to work 
3 = Homemaker 10 = Laid off 
4 = Full-time student 11 =  Retired 
5 = Leave of absence for medical reasons 
(holding job, plans to return to work) 
12 =  Other – Specify: 
___________________ 
6 = Unemployed <6 months, but expects to work 88 = Not Applicable 
7 = Unemployed >6 months, but expects to work 99 =  Don’t know 
 
 
10. What is your first language (What language are you most comfortable in)?  
_______________________ 
 
 
11. Are you fluent in reading & writing English?  ___________________ 
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement 
is characteristic or true of you.  The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
1.  I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority 
(teacher, boss, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I have difficulty making eye-contact with others. 0 1 2 3 4 
3.  I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work 
with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I find it easy to make friends of my own age. 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the street. 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
10.  I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 0 1 2 3 4 
13.  I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 0 1 2 3 4 
14.  I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the 
opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15.  I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in 
social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16.  I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 3 4 
17.  I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 0 1 2 3 4 
18.  When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19.  I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20.  I am unsure whether to greet someone I know only slightly. 0 1 2 3 4 
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Anticipatory Social Behaviors Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003).   
 
The following items ask you about behaviors, thoughts, and mental images that some people have prior to 
engaging in a social situation. Read each item below and select the option that best characterizes what you do 
prior to a social situation.  
 
1       2   3   4 
               Never              Always 
 
 
 
1.  I think about similar situations in which I have failed in the past. 1 2 3 4 
2.  I try to think of everything that could happen. 1 2 3 4 
3.  I imagine the worst that could happen. 1 2 3 4 
4.  I go over in detail what might happen. 1 2 3 4 
5.  I try to picture how I will appear to others. 1 2 3 4 
6.  I try to plan what I am going to say. 1 2 3 4 
7.  I rehearse conversations in my mind. 1 2 3 4 
8.  I remind myself of things I should not do. 1 2 3 4 
9.  I think about ways in which I could put things right if I make a fool of 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 
10.  I think about ways in which I could avoid having to face the situation. 1 2 3 4 
11.  I think about ways in which I could escape from the situation if it gets too 
embarrassing. 
1 2 3 4 
12.  I make a conscious effort not to think about the situation. 1 2 3 4 
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Focus of Attention Questionnaire (Woody, 1996) 
 
While interacting with others, some people focus on exactly what they are doing, while others find 
themselves focusing on other things such as feelings in their body, or objects in the room. We’re 
interested in what you are focusing on right now, as you wait for the social interaction to begin. Please 
read the items below and indicate what you are concentrating on and thinking about. 
 
Please use the following rating scale: 
 
        1        2   3       4                      5 
Not at  all            Somewhat       Moderately                 A lot                    Totally           
 
 
  
1. I am focusing on the other person’s appearance or dress. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am focusing on the features or conditions of the physical surroundings 
(e.g., appearance, temperature). 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am focusing on what I should say or do during the social interaction. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am focusing on the impression I am going to make on my partner and/or 
the researchers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am focusing on how my interaction partner might feel about 
himself/herself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am focusing on what I will think of my interaction partner and/or what I 
think about the researchers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am focusing on my level of anxiety. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I am focusing on what the researchers are saying/doing. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am focusing on my internal bodily reactions (e.g., heart rate, sweating). 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I am focusing on past social failures. 1 2 3 4 5 
96 
Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) 
 
Here are some different ways that people can feel about working and concentrating. Please indicate how 
strongly each statement applies to you.   
 
1 = Almost never   2 = Sometimes   3 = Often   4 = Always 
 
 
1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises 
around. 
1 2 3 4 
2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my 
attention.     
1 2 3 4 
3. When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me. 1 2 3 4 
4. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me. 1 2 3 4 
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what’s 
going on in the room around me. 
1 2 3 4 
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people talking 
in the same room. 
1 2 3 4 
7. When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out 
distracting thoughts. 
1 2 3 4 
8. I have a hard time concentrating when I’m excited about something. 1 2 3 4 
9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst. 1 2 3 4 
10. I can quickly switch from one task to another. 1 2 3 4 
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task. 1 2 3 4 
12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between the listening and writing 
required when taking notes during lectures. 
1 2 3 4 
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to. 1 2 3 4 
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking on the phone. 1 2 3 4 
15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once. 1 2 3 4 
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly.       1 2 3 4 
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily shift my attention back to what 
I was doing before. 
1 2 3 4 
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention 
away from it. 
1 2 3 4 
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks. 1 2 3 4 
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at 
it from another point of view. 
1 2 3 4 
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Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1979; Beck & Steer, 1987) 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements.  Please read each group of 
statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the 
way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today.  Circle the number 
beside the statement you have picked.  If several statements in the group seem to apply equally 
well, circle the highest number for that group.  Be sure that you do not choose more than one 
statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in 
Appetite). 
 
 
1. Sadness 
0. I do not feel sad. 
1. I feel sad much of the time. 
2. I am sad all the time. 
3. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
2.    Pessimism 
0 I am not discouraged about my future. 
1 I feel more discouraged about my future that 
I used to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me. 
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get 
worse. 
3.   Past Failure 
0 I do not feel like a failure. 
1 I have failed more than I should have. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the 
things I enjoy. 
1 I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I 
used to enjoy. 
3 I can’t get any pleasure from the things I 
used to enjoy. 
5.   Guilty Feelings 
0 I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or 
should have done. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
6.  Punishment Feelings 
0 I don’t feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished. 
7. Self-Dislike 
0 I feel the same about myself as 
ever. 
1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I dislike myself. 
8. Self-Criticalness 
0 I don’t criticize or blame myself 
more than usual. 
1 I am more critical of myself than I 
used to be. 
2 I criticize myself for all of my 
faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad 
that happens. 
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
0 I don’t have any thoughts of killing 
myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, 
but I would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the 
chance. 
10. Crying 
0 I don’t cry any more than I used to. 
1 I cry more than I used to. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
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11. Agitation 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to 
stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep 
moving or doing something. 
12. Loss of Interest 
0 I have not lost interest in other people or 
activities. 
1 I am less interested in other people or things 
than before. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other 
people or things. 
3 It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
13. Indecisiveness 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than 
usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making 
decisions that I used to. 
3 I have trouble making any decisions. 
14. Worthlessness 
0 I do not feel I am worthless. 
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and 
useful as I used to. 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other 
people. 
3 I feel utterly worthless. 
15. Loss of Energy 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 
1 I have less energy than I used to have. 
2 I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
0 I have not experienced any change in my 
sleeping pattern.    
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual 
1b.  I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 
2b   I sleep a lot less than usual 
3a I sleep most of the day. 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to 
sleep. 
17.  Irritability 
0 I am no more irritable than usual. 
1 I am more irritable than usual. 
2 I am much more irritable than 
usual. 
3 I am irritable all the time. 
18. Changes in Appetite 
0 I have not experienced any change 
in my appetite. 
1a My appetite is somewhat less than 
usual. 
1b My appetite is somewhat greater 
than usual. 
2a My appetite is much less than 
usual. 
2b My appetite is much greater than 
usual. 
3a I have no appetite at all. 
3b I crave food all the time 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
0 I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on 
anything for very long. 
3 I find I can’t concentrate on 
anything. 
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than 
usual. 
1 I get more tired or fatigued more 
easily than usual. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot 
of the things I used to do. 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do 
most of the things I used to do. 
21. Loss of Interest in Sex 
0 I have not noticed any recent 
change in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I 
used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex 
now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex 
completely. 
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Anxiety Sensitivity Index – 3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007) 
 
Enter the number from the scale below that best describes how typical or characteristic each of the 18 items 
is of you, putting the number next to the item. You should make your ratings in terms of how much you 
agree or disagree with the statement as a general description of yourself.   
 
0 = very little     1 = a little           2 = some          3 = much                 4 = very much 
 
 
1. It is important for me not to appear nervous. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy.     0 1 2 3 4 
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be seriously ill. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. When I tremble in the presence of others, I fear what people might think of me. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that I won’t be able to breathe properly. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that I’m going to have a heart attack. 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I worry that other people will notice my anxiety. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. When I feel “spacey” or spaced out I worry that I may be mentally ill. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. It scares me when I blush in front of people. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something 
seriously wrong with me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. When I begin to sweat in a social situation, I fear people will think negatively of 
me. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that I might be going crazy. 0 1 2 3 4 
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I could choke to death. 0 1 2 3 4 
16. When I have trouble thinking clearly, I worry that there is something wrong 
with me.       
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint in public. 0 1 2 3 4 
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is something terribly wrong with me. 0 1 2 3 4 
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WAIS III Letter-Number Sequencing Subtest (Wechsler, 1997)* 
 
Set 
Size 
 
Trial          Item/ Response 
Trial Score   (0 
or 1) 
Item Score (0, 
1, 2, or 3) 
2 1                M-4     (4-M)   
2                8-R      (8-R)   
3                D-3      (3-D)   
3 4                G-4-P     (4-G-P)   
5                E-2-M    (2-E-M)   
6                J-1-9       (1-9-J)   
4 7                T-7-E-5     (5-7-E-T)   
8                X-1-L-4     (1-4-L-X)   
9                7-V-2-T     (2-7-T-V)   
5 10              6-F-4-P-2       (2-4-6-F-P)   
11              G-2-C-7-W    (2-7-C-G-W)     
12              5-N-3-S-8       (3-5-8-N-S)     
6 13              B-3-L-6-N-1      (1-3-6-B-L-N)     
14              Y-7-I-6-F-4        (4-6-7-F-I-Y)     
15              6-F-8-C-1-U       (1-6-8-C-F-U)    
7 16              R-3-D-1-X-6-L      (1-3-6-D-L-R-X)     
17              3-T-8-K-1-P-7       (1-3-7-8-K-P-T)     
18              F-1-H-5-S-3-D       (1-3-5-D-F-H-S)     
8 19              3-I-7-V-2-N-9-A       (2-3-7-9-A-I-N-V)     
20              D-1-S-7-C-6-M-3      (1-3-6-7-C-D-M-S)     
21              7-E-2-T-5-Y-8-P       (2-5-7-8-E-P-T-Y)     
Total Raw Score 
 (Maximum=21) 
  
  
 
*This test has been modified to preserve test security.  The numbers and letters used are not those in the 
actual WAIS III. 
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